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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1980s, for-profit and nonprofit hospitals have
undergone an unprecedented number of mergers,' reflecting the
dramatic changes in the health care industry.2  The Federal Trade
Commission ("FTC") and Department of Justice ("DOJ") have chal-
lenged mergers of both types of hospitals.3 Recently, however, a hand-
1. See ABA Antitrust Section, ANNUAL REVIEW OF 1992 ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS,
301-311 (1993). Between 1981 to 1991, there were 195 mergers. See Howard J. Anderson, AHA
Lists Hospital Merger Activity for 12-Year Period, HOSPrrALS, June 20, 1992, at 62. The in-
crease in mergers has continued into the 1990s. There were 735 mergers in 1995 compared to
18 in 1993. See Michael S. Jacobs, Presumptions, Damn Presumptions and Economic Theory:
The Role of Empirical Evidence in Hospital Merger Analysis, 31 IND. L. REV. 125, 127 (1998).
The mergers discussed in this Note are horizontal mergers between nonprofit private hospitals.
2. During the last decade, significant changes have occurred in the hospital industry.
The switch from a cost-based to a fixed price system of reimbursement has contributed to excess
capacity. After World War H, the government passed the Hill-Burton Act, which subsidized
hospital construction and thus encouraged rapid growth. See James E. Magleby, Hospital
Mergers and Antitrust Policy: Arguments Against a Modification of Current Antitrust Law, 41
ANTITRUST BULL. 137, 138 (1996). In addition, the creation of Medicare/Medicaid gave hospitals
little incentive to reduce spending. See id. The government's cost-based payment method fur-
ther contributed to the creation of additional services and facilities. See id. at 138-39. Unlike
the cost-based payment system, the current prospective payment system (PPS) sets the price
that the government will pay for a particular diagnosis regardless of the actual cost to the
hospital, making the hospital responsible for any costs that exceed the fixed amount. See 42
U.S.C. § 1395ww(dX5) (1994). Private insurers have established similar payment plans. See
Magleby, supra, at 139. Cost-containment measures have contributed to a decline in hospital
admissions, resulting in excess capacity and declining revenue. See Federal Antitrust Policy in
the Health Care Marketplace: Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate,
105th Cong. 71, 73 (1997) (statement of Joe Sims, partner, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue)
[hereinafter Sims Testimony]. Further, improved medical technology allows many procedures
to be performed on an out-patient basis and thus contributes to a reduction in inpatient
services. See Magelby, supra, at 139-40.
3. Organizational form usually does not matter under antitrust law. See 1A PHILLIP
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND
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ful of nonprofit hospitals have offered nonprofit status as a "defense"
to federal challenges to nonprofit hospital mergers. 4 Although not a
complete defense-nonprofit status alone does not remove the entity
from antitrust scrutiny-a limited "defense" has evolved as nonprofit
hospitals claim that a nonprofit merger is less likely to have anti-
competitive effects than an equivalent for-profit merger.5
THEIR APPLiCATION I 261a, at 260-61 (1997). However, state-owned hospitals are not subject to
federal antitrust law because of the state-action doctrine. See FTC v. Hospital Bd. of Dirs., 38
F.3d 1184, 1187-88 (11th Cir. 1994).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 145-46
(E.D.N.Y. 1997); FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1296-97 (W.D. Mich.
1996), affd, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp.
1213, 1222-23 (W.D. Mo. 1995), affd, 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Carillon
Health Sys. 707 F. Supp 840, 849 (W.D. Va. 1989), affd, 892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989).
5. See Mary Lou Steptoe & Francis M. Fryscak, Review of Traditional Defenses, Noerr-
Pennington, Efficiencies, and Not-For-Profit Status, American Health Lawyers Association
Annual Antitrust in the Health Care Field Meeting, 1, 3 (Feb. 1998) [on file with the author].
Both courts and commentators have debated the significance of nonprofit status under
federal antitrust law. Some commentators contend that nonprofit status may prevent anti-
competitive behavior. They argue that because nonprofit hospitals are not organized to
distribute profits, these entities lack incentive to maximize revenue, see generally William J.
Lynk, Property Rights and the Presumptions of Merger Analysis, 39 ANTITRUST BULL. 363 (1994)
[hereinafter Lynk, Property Rights], and when in possession of market power will not engage in
anti-competitive behavior. See William G. Kopit & Robert W. McCann, Toward a Definitive
Antitrust Standard for Nonprofit Hospital Mergers, 13 J. HEALTH POL., POLy & L. 635, 643-44
(1988). Specifically, a board of directors composed of local community leaders and employers
has no incentive to raise prices, which virtually guarantees that the entity will not engage in
anti-competitive behavior. See William J. Lynk, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers and the Exercise of
Market Power, 38 J.L. & ECON. 437, 440-42 (1995) [hereinafter Lynk, Nonprofit Hospital
Mergers]; see also William G. Kopit & Tanya B. Vanderbilt, Unique Issues in the Analysis of
Non-Profit Hospital Mergers, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 254, 269-70 (1996). These commentators claim
that nonprofit hospitals respond differently to highly concentrated markets, and because a
nonprofit entity has different incentives than a for-profit one, courts and federal antitrust agen-
cies should consider nonprofit status in evaluating a proposed merger's effect. See Fredric J.
Entin et al., Hospital Collaboration: The Need for an Appropriate Antitrust Policy, 29 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 107, 123-26 (1994); see generally William G. Kopit & Neil N. Rosenbaum,
Rethinking the Significance of Merging Hospitals, America Health Lawyers Association Annual
Antitrust in the Health Care Field Meeting (Feb. 1998) (on file with author). See also Lynk,
Nonprofit Hospital Mergers, supra, at 438-49, 458-59.
In response to these arguments, the federal antitrust agencies along with numerous anti-
trust scholars emphasize the lack of evidence demonstrating that nonprofits act differently than
for-profits and warrant different treatment under the antitrust laws. They argue that nonprofit
entities will exercise market power and should be treated like for-profits for the purposes of
antitrust analysis. According to Robert Bloch, former chief of the Department of Justice's
Antitrust Division that had responsibility for the health care industry, "[bloth common sense
and economic theory demonstrate that competitive behavior and financial performance of non-
profit hospitals-including the incentive to raise prices when faced with less competition-will
not differ materially from investor-owned hospitals." See Lynk, Property Rights, supra, at 363.
Similarly, commentators have suggested that the antitrust laws appropriately apply to nonprof-
its because these entities share incentives to act anti-competitively and often compete with for-
profits. See 1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 1 261a, at 261-62. For a discussion of how
federal courts have analyzed this issue, see infra notes 123-43 and accompanying text.
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Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the FTC and DOJ review
proposed mergers to determine whether the merger will have any
significant anti-competitive effects.6 Congressional policy underlying
these statutes seeks to protect consumer welfare by preserving
competition in the market7 Consumers benefit from competition
because it encourages producers to offer the best quality at the lowest
price.8
Although the Supreme Court has established that the non-
profit sector is subject to the antitrust laws9 and numerous appellate
courts have held that nonprofit status alone cannot rebut a presump-
tion of illegality,10 courts are split on the extent to which nonprofit
status can be considered in predicting the competitive effects of a
merger. Four district courts have recently determined that nonprofit
status deserves consideration when evaluating whether a proposed
merger will lessen competition."' In contrast, other courts, including
the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits, have rejected the view that non-
profits are less likely to act anti-competively and have refused to treat
nonprofits differently when determining the potential merger's anti-
competitive effects.
12
Federal Trade Commission v. Butterworth Health Corp., which
involved the proposed merger of two nonprofit hospitals in Grand
Rapids, Michigan, dramatically increased the significance of nonprofit
status to antitrust analysis. 3 Although the district court agreed that
the FTC had shown that the proposed merger would result in a sig-
nificant concentration of power in the relevant markets and give the
6. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
7. See David L. Meyer & Charles F. (Rick) Rule, Health Care Collaboration Does Not
Require Substantive Antitrust Reform, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 169, 176-82 (1994).
8. See id. at 178.
9. See generally NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (holding the NCAA is sub-
ject to antitrust laws); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (holding that the
Sherman Act applied to an attorney association, a nonprofit entity).
10. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 665 (3d Cir. 1993); FTC v. University
Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1224 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp.,
898 F.2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 1990); Hospital Corp. of America v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1390 (7th
Cir. 1986).
11. See United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. 121, 145-46 (E.D.N.Y.
1997); FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1296-97 (W.D. Mich. 1996) afld,
121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213, 1222-23
(W.D. Mo. 1995) affd, 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Carilon Health Sys. 707 F.
Supp 840, 849 (W.D. Va. 1989), affd, 892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989).
12. See, e.g., University Health, 938 F.2d at 1224; Rockford, 898 F.2d at 1285; Hospital
Corp. of America, 807 F.2d at 1390.
13. Federal Trade Commission v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D.
Mich. 1996), affd 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
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merged entity an "undue percentage share" of those markets, 14 the
Butterworth court allowed the merger to proceed. 15 Previous courts
have given some weight to nonprofit status, but the district court
decision in Butterworth marks the first time a court has embraced the
notion that nonprofit hospitals act differently in the marketplace and
therefore require different treatment under the antitrust laws.1
6
The FTC appealed the district court decision to the Sixth
Circuit which issued a per curiam opinion holding that the district
court decision was "not legally erroneous."'7 Although the circuit
court only summarized the district court's opinion and provided little
of its own analysis, it did not challenge the district court's reliance on
nonprofit status in determining that the merger would not have anti-
competitive effects. 8 This affirmance by the circuit court marks the
first time an appellate court has permitted consideration of nonprofit
status. 9
This Note uses the Butterworth case to consider how nonprofits
should be treated in determining whether a merger is likely to have
anti-competitive effects. It challenges the factors recognized by the
Butterworth court, examines the arguments regarding whether non-
profits behave differently than for-profits, and analyzes whether non-
profits should enjoy different treatment under the antitrust laws.
The Note suggests that the market behavior of nonprofit hospitals is
materially similar to that of for-profits, and that, therefore, a less
stringent application of the antitrust laws is not justified.
Part II discusses the organizational differences between the
nonprofit and for-profit sector generally and then surveys the empiri-
cal studies on the behavior of nonprofit and for-profit hospitals. Part
III outlines the analysis of a merger under Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, reviews the legal treatment of nonprofit status itself as well as of
nonprofit hospitals specifically, and discusses the important role of
competition in the health care industry. Part IV compares case law
14. Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1294. The court accepted the agency's market definition
and concentration figures. See id. The court then concluded that the FTC had established its
prima facie case showing that the proposed merger would violate Section 7. See id.
15. See id. at 1302.
16. See Thomas L. Greaney, Night Landings on an Aircraft Carrier: Hospital Mergers and
Antitrust Law, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 191, 212 (1997) (stating that the Butterworth opinion is the
"most revolutionary hospital merger decision yet issued").
17. Butterworth, No. 96-2440, 1997 WL 420543, at *3 (6th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
18. See id at*2.
19. Although the district court opinions in Freeman and Carillon were also affirmed by
appellate courts, these courts did not address the nonprofit issue. See, e.g., FTC v. Freeman
Hosp., 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995) (affirming without published opinion); United States v.
Carilion Health Sys., 892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989).
1999]
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treatment of nonprofit status. Part V critiques the district court opin-
ion in Butterworth and advocates that traditional antitrust analysis
should be applied regardless of ownership status because competition
is the best guarantor of consumer welfare. In Part VI, the Note sug-
gests that emphasis on nonprofit status, especially confidence in the
good motives of a nonprofit entity in light of competitive harm, does
not fit within the legal framework of antitrust law. In conclusion,
Part VII summarizes why courts should not rely on nonprofit status
in evaluating whether a merger will have anti-competitive effects.
II. DISCUSSION OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES
OF THE BEHAVIOR OF NONPROFIT HOSPITALS
When considering whether nonprofits should be treated differ-
ently than for-profits, it is important to first look at whether nonprof-
its in fact act differently and whether any differences that exist justify
different treatment under the antitrust laws.
There are legal and economic differences in the organizational
structure of the two sectors. Nonprofits are prohibited from distrib-
uting surplus revenue to individuals;20 are generally exempt from fed-
eral and state corporate income tax, property tax, and sales tax;21 do
not have access to equity capital;22 and often receive donations and
grants.23 Nonprofit organizations, moreover, are frequently directed
by a volunteer board of directors.2
20. See Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838 (1981).
A nonprofit can generate surplus revenue, but the organization must keep net earnings or use
the amount for activities consistent with the organization's purpose. See DENNIS R. YOUNG, IF
NOT FOR PROFIT, FOR WHAT? 11 (1983). Henry Hansmann has coined the term "nondistribution
constraint" to refer to this limitation. See Hansmann, supra, at 838. Although dividends are
distributed differently under the nonprofit form, profit can also be seen in "salaries and
perquisites." See 1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 1 261a, at 261.
21. See Henry Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization, in THE
NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 27, 40 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987) [hereinafter
Hansmann, Economic Theories]; see also David C. Hammack & Dennis R. Young, Perspectives
on Nonprofits in the Marketplace, in NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN A MARET ECONOMY 1, 5
(David C. Hammach & Dennis R. Young, eds., 1993). Section 501(cX3) of the Internal Revenue
Code offers a tax exemption for nonprofits provided, for instance, that the entity serve a
charitable purpose and not distribute any part of earnings to an individual. I.R.C. § 501(cX3)
(1994).
22. See Richard Steinberg, Nonprofit Organizations and the Market, in THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 118, 123 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987).
23. See id. This source of funding is particularly important for donative nonprofits. See
YOUNG, supra note 20, at 12. Hospitals are usually considered commercial nonprofits as they
rely on the sale of services for profit. See id.
24. See Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the
Nonprofit and For-Profit Organizational Forms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457,466-67 (1996).
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Whether nonprofit hospitals behave differently than for-profits
has been the subject of debate and study. Results of these studies are
in conflict regarding costs, 2 efficiency,26 prices charged,27 and profits.28
Despite the inconsistency of these findings, experts agree that any dif-
ferences between nonprofits and for-profits are disappearing as com-
petition from third-party payers increases. 29 As the market becomes
25. See Robert Charles Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1417, 1455 (1980) (discussing studies that have concluded for-profits have lower
costs than nonprofits); see also Stuart H. Altman & David Shactman, Should We Worry About
Hospitals'High Administrative Costs?, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 798 (1997) (stating that one study
has found for-profits have lower costs per patient); Steinberg, supra note 22, at 129-30 (noting
that there is little difference in costs between hospitals in general, but that for-profit chain
hospitals are much less costly). But see, Bradford H. Gray & Walter J. McNerney, For-Profit
Enterprise in Health Care, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1523, 1524 (1986) (stating that studies show
that for-profit hospitals are not less costly than nonprofits). One 1996 study showed that for-
profits have higher total costs per patient. See Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein,
Costs of Care and Administration at For-Profit and Other Hospitals in the United States, 336
NEW ENG. J. MED. 769, 772 (1997). This study found that for-profits have higher administrative
costs than nonprofits. See id. However, it may be difficult to compare the administrative costs
of the two sectors because for example, these costs may be reported differently for tax purposes.
See Study Says For Profit Hospitals Have Higher Administrative Costs, MED. & HEALTH, Mar.
17, 1997, available in 1997 WL 8689004.
26. See Regina E. Herzlinger & William S. Krasker, Who Profits From Nonprofits?, HARV.
Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 93, 103 (stating that for-profits use labor more efficiently and
generate more patient days per bed than nonprofits); see also Clark, supra note 25, at 1462.
One study stated that the efficiency of for-profits and nonprofits appears similar. See Edmund
R. Becker & Frank A. Sloan, Hospital Ownership and Performance, 23 ECON. INQUIRY 21, 31
(1985). But see PAUL FELDSTEIN, HEALTH CARE EcONOMICS 247 (1988) (arguing that for-profits
are more profitable because of higher prices not because of greater efficiency); Robert V.
Pattison & Hallie M. Katz, Investor-Owned And Not-For-Profit Hospitals, 309 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 347, 353 (1983) (stating that data does not support the proposition that a for-profit chain
is more efficient than a nonprofit one).
27. Some studies have not found any pricing differences between the nonprofits and for-
profits. See Herzlinger & Krasker, supra note 26, at 93. Those studies that have found higher
prices associated with for-profit hospitals may be explained by their location, as many for-profits
locate in areas where they can charge higher prices. See Mark V. Pauly, Nonprofit Firms in
Medical Markets, 77 AM. ECON. REv. 257, 261 (1987). Some studies have shown nonprofit
hospitals charge lower prices than for-profit ones. See Lynk, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers, supra
note 5, at 439. One study reports that for-profits charge higher prices for ancillary services. See
Pattison & Katz, supra note 26, at 349.
28. See Herzlinger & Krasker, supra note 26, at 101 (discussing that for-profits do not
have higher returns than nonprofits); see also Frank A. Sloan & Robert A. Vraciu, Investor-
Owned and Not-For-Profit Hospitals: Addressing Some Issues, 2 HEALTH AFF. 25, 31 (1983)
(stating that their study "showed no statistically significant difference" between the after tax
profit of nonprofits and for-profits). But see Thomas J. Hoerger, 'Profit' Variability in For-Profit
and Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 10 J. HEALTH ECON. 259, 260, 286-87 (1991) (stating that private
nonprofit hospitals experience less variation in their profits than for-profits, which suggests the
two operate differently); Pattison & Katz, supra note 26, at 349 (stating that for-profits earn
higher profits from ancillary services than nonprofits). Note that nonprofits cannot technically
earn a profit but can use surplus to benefit the entity. See I.R.C. § 501(cX3) (1994); see also su-
pra note 20 and accompanying text.
29. See David S. Salkever & Richard G. Frank, Health Services, in WHO BENEFITS FROM
THE NONPROFIT SECTOR?, 24, 35-39 (Charles T. Clotfelter ed., 1992); see also Sims Testimony,
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more competitive, the prices charged by both types of hospitals will
likely be closer to marginal coSts.30
Furthermore, studies show numerous similarities in the be-
havior of for-profit and nonprofit hospitals.31 First, despite different
organizational structures, the management of both sectors are con-
cerned about costs and recognize that profits (or surplus revenues) are
essential for operation.3 2 Nonprofits have responded to competition by
establishing for-profit subsidiaries, selling services to for-profits, and
participating in joint ventures with for-profit hospitals.33 Both for-
profits and nonprofits advertise and market themselves in efforts to
increase patient flow,3 and both have been accused of abusing the
Medicare system.35 Due to these similarities, consumers may have
difficulty distinguishing between the two sectors.36 These examples
supra note 2, at 73, 74 (discussing that managed care has forced nonprofits to compete on price
by providing services historically provided only by hospitals, contributing to a wide-scale
consolidation in the hospital industry).
30. See David Dranove, Pricing By Non-Profit Institutions: The Case of Hospital Cost-
Shifting, 7 J. HEALTH ECON. 47,56 (1988).
31. Ownership differences matter very little in market behavior. See Pauly, supra note
27, at 261-62 ; see also Becker & Sloan, supra note 26, at 31 (noting that the two ownership
forms operate very similarly); Theodore R. Marmor et al., Nonprofit Organizations and Health
Care, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 221, 234-36 (Walter W. Powell, ed.,
1987) (stating that today, few differences exist between nonprofit and for-profit hospitals); Sloan
& Vraciu, supra note 28, at 34.
32. See Erwin A. Blackstone & Joseph P. Fuhr, Jr., An Antitrust Analysis of Non-Profit
Hospital Mergers, 8 REV. OF INDUS. ORG. 473, 474 (1992) (stating that both for-profits and
nonprofits are under greater pressure to reduce costs); see also David B. Starkweather, Profit
Making by Nonprofit Hospitals, in NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN A MARKET ECONOMY 105, 108
(David C. Hammond & Dennis R. Young eds., 1993) (noting that nonprofits make a profit in
order to continue operations). For both hospital types, "business acumen [and] coordination" are
required for success. See Woolhandler & Himmelstein, supra note 25, at 773-74. Furthermore,
nonprofits must compete for financial capital. See Cyril F. Chang & Howard P. Tuckman, The
Profits of Not-For-Profit Hospitals, 13 J. HEALTH POL., POLY & L. 547, 549 (1988). Nonprofit
managers, like their for-profit counterparts, dislike increased competition. See Lynk, Nonprofit
Hospital Mergers, supra note 5, at 458.
33. See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 436-38 (1982)
(noting that many nonprofit hospitals have established for-profit subsidiaries and have entered
into joint ventures with for-profit entities); see also Marmor et al., supra note 31, at 229.
34. See Nancy Ann Jeffrey, Hospitals Use TV Spots to Boost Business, WALL ST.J., Sept.
26, 1996, at B10; see also Richard L. O'Brien & Michael J. Hailer, Investor-Owned or Nonprofit?
Issues and Implications for Academic and Ethical Values in a Catholic Teaching Hospital, 313
NEW. ENG. J. MED. 198, 199 (1985) quoted in Mark Krause, Comment, "First Do No Harm": An
Analysis of the Nonprofit Hospital Sales Act, 45 UCLA L. REV. 503, 511 (1997).
35. See George Anders, Pricey Operation: A Plan to Cut Back on Medicare Expenses Goes
Awry; Costs Soar, WALL ST.J., Oct. 3, 1996, at Al.
36. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Altruism, Nonprofits, and Economic Theory, 34 J. ECON.
LIT. 701, 718 (1996) (noting that for-profits operate in most of the same areas as nonprofits).
Changes in health care industry have resulted in "blurred" lines between the conduct of non-
profit and for-profit hospitals. See Starkweather, supra note 32, at 107. Nonprofit hospitals ac-
count for the majority of all hospitals as about 85 percent of hospitals are nonprofits. See
564
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indicate that despite differences in financing and dividend distribu-
tion, nonprofit and for-profit hospitals share many of the same in-
centives to act anti-competitively.37
Second, studies have found that ownership status does not de-
termine the type of patient treated38 Nonprofit and for-profit hospi-
tals provide care for the same types of patients. 9 Third, both types of
hospitals are equally accessible to the uninsured and indigent, and
both screen patients based on their ability to pay.40
Demise of the Not-for-Profit Has Been Greatly Exaggerated, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Dec. 23, 1996, at
33.
37. See United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1285 (N.D. IM. 1989)
affd, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that when a nonprofit's objectives are inconsistent
with "the objectives of a competitive market place, the not-for-profit hospital has incentive to act
anti-competitively"); see also Herzlinger & Krasker, supra note 26, at 94 (suggesting that non-
profits have the same motives to act anti-competitively as for-profits by stating that nonprofit
managers are just as likely to use funds to pay for "larger salaries, organizational perquisites,
and excessively large staffs"); Lynk, Property Rights, supra note 5, at 377 (recognizing that
nonprofits have the same motives as for-profits to act anti-competitively).
38. Ownership status may not determine the type of patient served. See Herzlinger &
Krasker, supra note 26, at 103; see also Henry Hansmann, The Changing Roles of Public,
Private, and Nonprofit Enterprise in Education, Health Care, and Other Human Services, in
INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: CHILD CARE, EDUCATION, MEDICAL CARE, AND LONG-
TERM CARE IN AMERICA 245, 254 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1996); Sloan & Vraciu, supra note 28, at
33 (discussing a study of Florida hospitals finding little difference in the type of patient treated).
39. See Salkever & Frank, supra note 29, at 38-39 (stating that studies have found payer
mixes of nonprofits and for-profits are similar with both treating charity or self-paying patients
and Medicaid patients). Studies have found that public hospitals do care for more uninsured
and poor patients than private nonprofits and for-profits. See id. at 39. One study of Virginia
hospitals found that for-profit hospitals provided more of their operating expenses to charity
care than nonprofits. See David Burda, For-Profits, Not-For-Profits Reignite Battle, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, May 8, 1995, at 28. But see Barbara Arrington & Cynthia Haddock, Who Really
Profits from Not-For-Profits?, 25 HEALTH SERv. RES. 291, 300-02 (1990) (finding that nonprofits
treat more poor patients than for-profits). Whether studies of charity care should include taxes
paid by for-profits is the subject of debate as the use of this data may change a study's results.
See Burda, supra.
Although some studies have found nonprofits provide slightly more care to indigents,
locational differences may account for these results. See Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever,
Nonprofit Organizations in the Health Sector, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1994, at 129, 138. Location
and selection of medical staff are better predictors of a hospital's patient mix than ownership.
See Pattison & Katz, supra note 26, at 350-51.
40. See Krause, supra note 34, at 510 (stating that "there is evidence to suggest the two
organizational forms provide the same access to care"); see also Herzinger & Krasker, supra
note 26, at 103 (finding that for-profit hospitals provide slightly more access to uninsured than
nonprofits). For-profit and nonprofit hospitals are concerned with patients' ability to pay. See
Maria O'Brien Hylton, The Economics and Politics of Emergency Health Care for the Poor: The
Patient Dumping Dilemma, 1992 BYU L. REv. 971, 975 (noting that private hospitals have a
tradition of avoiding economically undesirable patients); see also Marmor et al., supra note 31,
at 230 (discussing evidence that private nonprofits also carefully screen patients for ability to
pay).
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Fourth, nonprofits and for-profits now provide similar services
since many nonprofits have eliminated unprofitable services. 41 In
addition, for-profit and nonprofit hospitals also generally provide the
same quality of care to their patients.42 The competence of staff phy-
sicians and post-operative mortality rates are comparable for the two
types of hospitals.43 Both types of hospitals also have to meet the
same licensing and accreditation requirements.4
Strong evidence suggests that nonprofit and for-profit hospi-
tals operate similarly in important competitive dimensions. In gen-
eral, an entity's organizational structure does not affect the basic mo-
tivations of "stable growth, autonomy, and control."45 Regardless of
ownership structure, an organization seeks to maintain its existence
and meet its goals.46 The forces of competition and government regu-
lation are "paramount" for the functioning of both nonprofit and for-
profit hospitals.47 Given evidence that nonprofits have the same in-
centives as for-profits to act anti-competitively, it should not be in-
ferred that nonprofit hospitals are less likely to exercise market
41. See David A. Hyman, Hospital Conversions: Fact, Fantasy, and Regulatory Follies, J.
CORP. L. 741, 747 (1998) (noting that for-profits offer the same "range and quality of services" as
nonprofits); Starkweather, supra note 32, at 112 (stating that many have noted that there is
little distinction between the two types of hospitals). But see Arrington & Haddock, supra note
39, at 300 (stating that nonprofits are more accessible to these types of patients). In addition, a
1990 GAO report found that many service activities of nonprofit and for-profit hospitals are the
same. See Starkweather, supra note 32, at 130. This finding suggests that the service activities
of the two forms are becoming increasingly similar. See id.
42. See Marmor et al., supra note 31, at 235 (noting that there are not "appreciable differ-
ences" in the care provided to most patients by nonprofit and for-profit hospitals); see also Clark,
supra note 25, at 1455; Gray & McNerney, supra note 25, at 1526 (stating that there is no clear
difference between for-profits and nonprofits in the quality of care provided). But see Salkever
& Frank, supra note 29, at 37 (noting that one study found the expected length stay for charity
patients was shortest at for-profit hospitals, however for Medicaid patients there was less of a
differential). According to some experts, the growth of monitoring quality in the health care
system by managed care organizations as well as increasing information provided to consumers
will diminish any differences in quality that presently exist. See Frank & Salkever, supra note
39, at 132-34.
43. See Frank & Salkever, Nonprofit Organizations, supra note 39, at 131.
44. See Krause, supra note 34, at 508 & n.34.
45. Brody, supra note 24, at 505. Brody quotes Barry Bozeman who stated that these
motivations are "only minimally affected by... profit motive." Id. (quoting BARRY BOZEMAN,
ALL ORGANIZATIONS ARE PUBLIC: BRIDGING PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONAL THEORIES 149
(1987)). See also Pauly, supra note 27, at 262 (discussing that organizational form is much less
significant in behavior than economic incentive).
46. See Brody, supra note 24, at 468. These similarities have prompted debate about
whether nonprofits should continue to receive federal tax exemption. See id. at 457; see gener-
ally Charles B. Gilbert, Health-Care Reform and the Nonprofit Hospital: Is Tax-Exempt Status
Warranted?, 26 URB. LAW. 143 (1994).
47. Steinberg, supra note 22, at 134. Evidence exists that nonprofits respond to competi-
tion in the same manner as for-profits. See Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 32, at 487.
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power. The same antitrust concerns arise for nonprofit mergers as for
equivalent for-profits and thus, less stringent antitrust standards are
not justified.
HI. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF MERGERS
A. Mechanics of Merger Analysis
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers in which the
effect "may be substantially to lessen competition."48 Under the
Merger Guidelines and the case law, this statute prevents mergers
that create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise.49
Market power is usually defined as the ability to maintain prices over
a competitive level for an extended period of time.50 Congress enacted
Section 7 to prevent transactions that are likely to substantially
reduce competition.51
The FTC and DOJ use the Merger Guidelines to analyze the
competitive effects of proposed mergers. 52 The steps outlined in the
Merger Guidelines are: defining the relevant product and geographic
market; identifying actual and potential participants in the market;
and determining how the merger will affect market concentration,
which includes assessing the likely competitive effects of the merger
based on characteristics of the market and its participants, particu-
larly ease of entry and market conditions.53 These factors are evalu-
ated on a case by case basis.54
The Guidelines, like the case law, consider a significant in-
crease in concentration within a relevant market as the primary indi-
48. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994). Section 7 only requires a reasonable probability that the
merger will substantially lessen competition. See FTC v. Elders Grain, Inc., 868 F.2d 901, 906
(7th Cir. 1989); see also Hospital Corp. of America v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1389 (7th Cir. 1986).
49. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE & FTC, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 1.0. (1992)
[hereinafter MERGER GUIDELINES].
50. See 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 501, at 85 (1995). Market power is the ability to raise
prices above the competitive level without "losing so much business to other suppliers" as to
make the supracompetitive price unprofitable. United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898
F.2d 1278, 1283 (7th Cir. 1990).
51. See Rockford, 898 F.2d at 1283.
52. Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,104 (April 7, 1992)
(amended May 5, 1992 and April 8, 1997).
53. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 49, § 0.2.
54. See id. § 0.
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cator of anti-competitive impact of a proposed merger.55  The
Guidelines conduct the concentration inquiry in terms of the
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI "),56 which has been widely
adopted by courts.57 The significance of this data can be discounted or
enhanced by considerations of market characteristics such as entry
conditions and efficiencies. 58
Under the case law, a significant increase in market concen-
tration and an "undue percentage share" of the relevant market es-
tablishes a prima facie case.59 Courts have determined that once a
prima facie case is created, a presumption of illegality6° arises and the
burden of production shifts to the merging party.61 To successfully
rebut a prima facie case, the challenged party must show that market
share and concentration statistics inaccurately predict the effect on
competition in the relevant market.62 If the party effectively chal-
lenges the predictive value of the market share and concentration
evidence, the FTC must provide additional evidence of the merger's
anti-competitive effects. 63 The burden of persuasion remains with the
government at all times.6
55. See e.g., id. § 1.0; Rockford at 1282-83.
56. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 49, § 1.5. The HHI index squares the market
shares of each participant in the relevant market. The antitrust agency must show that a
significant increase in concentration would allow a firm to raise prices to an anti-competitive
level. The DOJ/ FTC Merger Guidelines state that a post-merger HHI above 1800 is evidence of
a high market concentration, and if the HHI exceeds 1800 an increase in the HHI of over 100
points is deemed likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise. See id.
§ 1.51.
57. See, e.g., FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1294 (W.D. Mich. 1996)
affd, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206,
1211 n.12 (11th Cir. 1991).
58. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 49, § 3.0. (entry) & 4.0. (efficiencies). Courts
have adopted similar analyses. See, e.g., Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1289; University Health,
938 F.2d at 1218.
59. United States v. Philadelphia Natfl Bank, 374 U.S. 321,363-64 (1963).
60. See Steven C. Sunshine, Non-Profits Use Intent as Defense, NATL. L.J., Mar. 31, 1997,
at Cl, C15. The premise behind the presumption of illegality is increases in market concentra-
tion will likely increase market power, giving firms the ability to raise prices farther above a
competitive level than they could before the merger. See id.
61. See University Health, 938 F.2d at 1218. Note that the Guidelines presumption fo-
cuses on high levels of concentration and a large increase in concentration rather than burden
shifting. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 49, § 1.5.
62. See University Health, at 1218-19 (quoting United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963)); see also United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974)
(allowing the defendant to rebut the presumption of illegality using evidence other than market
share data); FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1288-89 (W.D. Mich. 1996)
affd, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
63. See United States v. Baker Hughes Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 982-83 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
64. See id. at 983.
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B. Discussion of Countervailing Factors and Affirmative Defenses
Recognized by the Merger Guidelines and Case Law
The Merger Guidelines and the case law analyze elements that
suggest that market share and concentration statistics do not accu-
rately predict the merger's effect on competition. These factors, in-
cluding ease of entry, the imminent exit of a failing firm from the
market, and efficiencies,65 show that a proposed merger will not lessen
competition.
As stated in the Merger Guidelines, the DOJ and FTC must
consider the entry conditions of the market.6 When entry into the
market would be "timely, likely, and sufficient in its magnitude, char-
acter and scope" to prevent any attempt to increase prices signifi-
cantly above the competitive level, the merger will pose little antitrust
concern.67 New competitors deter the merged entity from abusing
market power by making anti-competitive practices unprofitable.68
Under the Guidelines, the failing-firm defense can negate an
inference of lessened competition. The Guidelines require a showing
that absent the merger, the assets of the firm will leave the market.69
Therefore, the merger does not raise antitrust concern because the
proposed merger will not decrease competition in the market.70
Efficiencies are also considered under the Merger Guidelines
because efficiencies are likely to result in lower costs and higher qual-
ity for the consumer. If there are "cognizable efficiencies" that would
not be accomplished absent the merger, the federal agencies may de-
cide not to challenge the proposed merger.7 1
Courts also consider the above factors. Because market power
is the ability to charge supra-competitive prices unchecked by new
entrants or other mitigating factors, 72 courts have allowed defendants
to offer evidence of ease of market entry to show that competitors
65. Both the failing firm and efficiencies defenses are "strictly construed." Jonathan B.
Baker, The Antitrust Analysis of Hospital Mergers and the Transformation of the Hospital
Industry, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1988, at 93, 161-63. The Merger Guidelines Section
1.2, which evaluates the likely competitive effects of the merger, is analytically equivalent to
these factors. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 49, § 1.2.
66. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 49, at § 3.0.
67. Id.
68. See 2A AREEDA ET AL., supra note 50, 1 420A, at 56.
69. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 49, at § 5.0.
70. See id.
71. Id. § 4.0 (Revised Apr. 8, 1997).
72. See 2A AREEDA ETAL., supra note 50, 501, at 85-86.
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could prevent the merger's potential anti-competitive effects.73 A
defendant may use ease of entry to rebut a presumption of illegality.74
Courts have accepted evidence of efficiencies as rebuttal evidence75 or
as an affirmative defense. 76 Finally, courts have considered evidence
of a failing firm as an affirmative defense. 77
C. Application of the Antitrust Laws to the Nonprofit Sector
Congress has ordained competition as the guiding principle for
antitrust analysis. 78 Competition will produce "the best allocation of
our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the
greatest material progress."79 Following this rationale, the Court in
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank8° emphasized that a
court can only consider competitive factors when determining whether
a merger will have anti-competitive effects8l-that is, a court cannot
determine that a noncompetitive solution would be more beneficial to
society than the competitive one,82 or that special characteristics of an
industry makes it unsuited to strict application of the antitrust laws.m
Neither the Clayton Act nor the Sherman Act include a statu-
tory exemption for nonprofits.8 The Supreme Court has held that
73. See e.g., FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1218 (11th Cir. 1991); see
Baker, supra note 65, at 152 (noting that examination of entry conditions and other factors
indicating an ability to collude may be enough to rebut an inference of the anti-competitive re-
sult of a high level of concentration).
74. See FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1218 (11th Cir. 1991); see also Ball
Memorial Hosp. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1336 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing the
significance of ease of entry in merger analysis).
75. See, e.g., University Health, 938 F.2d at 1222; FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946
F. Supp. 1285, 1300 (W.D. Mich. 1996) aff'd, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
76. See, e.g., United States v. Mercy Health Services, 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa 1995)
vacated by 107 F.3d 632, 634 (8th Cir. 1997) (vacating for mootness because the merger at issue
was abandoned).
77. See, e.g., E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, PoLicY, &
PROCEDURE 868-69 (1994).
78. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
79. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
80. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
81. See id. at 371 (stating that "[w]e are clear ... that a merger the effect of which may be
to substantially lessen competition, is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social
and economic debts or credits, it may be deemed beneficial").
82. See National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 693-95 (1978). That
Court held that antitrust law does not permit a challenge to competition itself. See id. at 695.
See also Catherine C. Eckel & Richard Steinberg, Competition, Performance, and Public Policy
Toward Nonprofits, in NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN A MARKET ECONOMY 57, 58 (David C.
Hammack & Dennis R. Young eds., 1993).
83. See Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 689.
84. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
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nonprofit organizations must comply with the antitrust laws. In
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,86 the Court
rejected the idea that an implicit exemption exists for nonprofits.87
Similarly, in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, the Court held that the
Sherman Act applied to nonprofit entities.88 The antitrust laws apply
to the nonprofit sector because the inability to earn a profit does not
ensure that an entity will act in the consumer's best interests.89 In
particular, it is difficult to prevent nonprofit organizations from vio-
lating the nondistribution constraint by distributing surplus to those
in control.90 Also, personal financial gain is not the sole motivator for
anti-competitive conduct.91
In the health care context, courts have also recognized that
nonprofit status alone will not rebut a presumption of illegality cre-
ated by the government's prima facie case. In Hospital Corporation of
America v. FTC, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that nonprofit struc-
ture "does not change human nature."92 The court explained that
most enterprises dislike competition,93 and suggested that the rift be-
tween nonprofit and for-profit hospitals might encourage the non-
profit to engage in anti-competitive behavior.9 4 Specifically, nonprofit
ideological objectives may offer additional incentives to reduce com-
petition.95 Following the rationale of the HCA decision, the Rockford
court stressed that nonprofit status did not remove the risk that an
85. See American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 576
(1982) (stating that "it is beyond debate that nonprofit organizations can be held liable under
antitrust laws.").
86. NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
87. See id. at 100 n.22. The Court suggests that a nonprofit entity must follow the anti-
trust laws absent a legislative exemption in stating that "[tihere is no doubt that the sweeping
language of § 1 applies to nonprofit entities....").
88. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786-87 (1975).
89. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 665 (3d Cir. 1993); see also IA AREEDA
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 261a, at 260-61.
90. See Richard Steinberg, How Should Antitrust Laws Apply to Nonprofit Organizations?
in GOvERNING, LEADING, AND MANAGING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 279, 287 (Dennis R. Young
et al. eds., 1993) (arguing that managers and board members could obtain private benefits
through excessive salaries and managerial perks and that better enforcement of the nondis-
tribution constraint would be difficult).
91. See id. Rather, for-profits and nonprofit managers share incentives to act anti-com-
petitively. See IA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 261a, at 261. See also supra note 47
and accompanying text.
92. Hospital Corp. of America v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1390 (7th Cir. 1986).
93. See id. at 1391.
94. See id. (discussing the "antipathy" toward for-profit hospitals because of some nonprof-
its' view that for-profits take the most affluent patients reducing greatly the nonprofits' ability
to cost-shift in order to defray the costs of charitable care).
95. See id. The court suggested that a nonprofit hospital may collude in order to obtain
higher profits that can fund charity care. See id.
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entity would exploit market power.96  Similarly, the court in
University Health noted that once a nonprofit has market power, no
checks exist to prevent it from acting anti-competively97
State legislation also does not provide an exemption for
nonprofits. Because of federalism, the state action doctrine permits
states to use regulation in place of federal antitrust laws.98 For an
activity to qualify for state action immunity, a state must satisfy a
two part test: the state must clearly articulate its policy and actively
supervise the policy's implementation. 99 Under this doctrine, some
states have enacted statutes that protect health care mergers and
joint ventures from federal enforcement of the antitrust laws.
Notably, these exemptions do not distinguish between nonprofits and
for-profits. 10o
In sum, nonprofits are not exempted from antitrust provisions.
Courts have reasoned that the nonprofit form does not justify less
stringent application of the antitrust laws. Thus, mergers between
nonprofit hospitals must be analyzed in the same way as for-profit
hospitals, with the preservation of competition guiding judicial deci-
sion making regarding the merger's likely effects.
D. Application of Traditional Antitrust Analysis to the
Hospital Industry
Antitrust law is based on the premise that competition benefits
consumers by offering the best quality at the lowest price.10' The ap-
plication of antitrust doctrine to the health care industry has been de-
bated.oa For instance, it has been suggested that the traditional pre-
sumption that high market concentration yields higher prices is inap-
plicable to the hospital industry. According to some health care ex-
perts, the traditional model does not apply because, unlike other in-
96. See United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 1990).
97. See FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1224 (11th Cir. 1991).
98. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943). Federalism concerns are behind al-
lowing state regulation to displace federal antitrust laws. See id. at 350-52.
99. See FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 631 (1992); see also California Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
100. See Meyer & Rule, supra note 7, at 208-10. The DOJ/FTC "Statements of Antitrust
Enforcement Policy in Health Care" also do not differentiate between nonprofit and for-profit
hospitals in the "safety zones" created for some types of hospital mergers. See DOJ/FTC
"Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care", reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 13,153 (Sept. 5, 1996).
101. See Meyer & Rule, supra note 7, at 181.
102. See id. at 180-81.
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dustries, hospital competition is not price-driven,o3 and competition
for physician and patients based on quality, services, and other
amenities has resulted in duplication of hospital services.0 4 These
commentators argue that hospital mergers achieve efficiencies by
eliminating duplication created by the "medical arms race" and thus
result in hospitals located in less concentrated markets charging
lower prices. 0 5
Numerous studies indicate, however, that the traditional
paradigm of lower prices in more competitive markets applies to the
health care industry.'06 A review of changes in the health care indus-
try help explain why hospital competition benefits consumers. Prior
to health care cost-containment measures, traditional insurers retro-
actively reimbursed hospitals for most costs. 07 Hospitals competed
for patients based on quality of care, facilities, and services, 08 and pa-
tients and their physicians selected hospitals based on these same
factors.1°9 Under this paradigm, insured patients are not concerned
103. See Entin et al., supra note 5, at 122-25 (arguing hospitals do not follow this competi-
tive paradigm and that instead, prices increase as competition increases); see also Gloria J.
Bazzoll et al., Federal Antitrust Merger Enforcement Standards: A Good Fit for the Hospital
Industry?, 20 J. HEALTH POL., PoLy & L., 137, 142 (1995) (stating that consumer-driven compe-
tition still exists in many areas making the traditional economic theories inapplicable to health
care markets). According to Bazzoli and her colleagues, patients do not chose a hospital based
on price because insurance covers the majority of patient expenses. See id. at 142-44; see also
Kopit & Vanderbilt, supra note 5, at 254-56 (discussing that the traditional model does not
apply because competition about price is less important in the health care industry).
104. See Entin et al., supra note 5, at 124-25; see also Kopit & Vanderbilt, supra note 5, at
257-58.
105. Some commentators believe that there is an absence of price-concentration correlation
in the hospital industry because of the "medical arms race." See Entin et al., supra note 5, at
123-25. See also James C. Robinson & Harold S. Luft, The Impact of Hospital Market Structure
on Patient Volume, Average Length of Stay, and the Cost of Care, 4 J. HEALTH EcON. 333, 353-54
(1985) (arguing that competition may increase price by affecting the quality of services provided
and efficiency of the delivery of these services). For example, hospitals buy expensive equip-
ment in an effort to attract patients. See Entin et al., supra note 5, at 124. Mergers may avoid
duplication and reduce prices. See id. at 125. But see David Dranove et al., Is Hospital
Competition Wastefid?, 23 RAND J. ECON. 247, 261 (1992) (challenging the argument that com-
petition in the hospital industry is "inefficient").
106. See infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
107. See Magleby, supra note 2, at 138-39.
108. See Jack Zwanziger & Glenn A. Melnick, Effects of Competition on the Hospital
Industry: Evidence From California, in COMPETrTlV APPROACHES TO HEALTH CARE REFORM
111, 113-114 (Richard J. Arnould et al. eds., 1993) (outlining the differences between this type of
competition and price-driven competition). The authors also note that payer-driven competition
is a result of the growth of managed care. See id. at 111-12, 114. See also United States v.
Mercy Health Services, 902 F. Supp. 973-74 (N.D. Iowa 1995), vacated by 107 F.3d 632, 634 (8th
Cir. 1997) (noting that traditionally hospitals competed based on "perceptions of quality" and
amenities).
109. See David Dranove et al., Price and Concentration in Hospital Markets: The Switch
From Patient-Driven to Payer-Driven Competition, 36 J.L. & ECON. 179, 182-83 (1993).
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about prices and they lack incentive to obtain information about their
care."10
Studies show, however, that the hospital market has shifted
from competition based upon services and amenities to competition
based on price,"' such that the standard economic assumption that
competition yields lower prices applies.112 The growth of third-party
payers who selectively contract to obtain discounted prices has in part
motivated this trend."8 For example, studies of the California health
care industry, an area with a high level of managed care penetration,
have found that managed care contributes to payer-driven
competition."4 Managed care encourages this type of competition
because through selective contracting, managed care organizations
110. See David Dranove, The Case for Competitive Reform in Health Care, in COMPlErrIVE
APPROACHES TO HEALTH CARE RRFORM 67, 71 (Richard J. Arnould et al. eds., 1993).
111. See Dranove et al., supra note 109, at 179-83 (discussing "patient-driven" and "payer-
driven" competition and explaining that patient-driven competition existed when hospitals
competed for patients who selected hospitals based on quality and amenities while payer-driven
competition is based upon price spurred by the current use of selective contracting).
112. See id. at 201; see also Dranove, supra note 110, at 73-74 (stating that in a payer-
driven system, lower prices result from increased competition and earlier studies with contrary
results used a measure of price that is irrelevant under payer-driven competition). Today, price
plays a "significant role" in hospital competition and market concentration affects pricing
behavior. Emmitt B. Keeler et al., The Changing Effects of Competition on Non-Profit and For-
Profit Hospital Pricing Behavior, 18 J. HEALTH EcON. 69, 71, 82-83 (1999). Further, nonprofit
hospitals in areas with fewer competitors charged higher prices than those in more competitive
areas. See id. at 71.
113. See Zwanziger & Melnick, supra note 108, at 112-14 (emphasizing that these payers
differ from patients because they have incentive to obtain pricing discounts and information
about price and quality). The prospective payment system also used by some third party payers
has contributed to price competition. See id. at 114; see also Sims Testimony, supra note 2, at
73-74.
114. Numerous studies of the health care industry have concluded that third-party payers
provide incentives for hospitals to compete on price. See Dranove et al., supra note 109, at 201;
see also Jonathan Gruber, The Effect of Competitive Pressure on Charity: Hospital Responses to
Price Shopping in California, 13 J. HEALTH. EcoN. 183, 204 (1994); Glenn A. Melnick et al., The
Effects of Market Structure and Bargaining Position on Hospital Prices, 11 J. HEALTH ECON.
217, 231-32 (1992); James C. Robinson, Decline in Hospital Utilization and Cost Inflation Under
Managed Care in California, J. AM. MED. ASS'N, 1060, 1062-63 (Oct. 2, 1996) (reporting that a
study of California hospitals found that managed care penetration is associated with lower
costs); Jack Zwanziger & Glenn A. Melnick, The Effects of Hospital Competition and the
Medicare PPS Program on Hospital Cost Behavior in California, 7 J. HEALTH ECON. 301, 317
(1988) (finding that selective contracting affects hospital behavior and that hospitals are
competing on price). Managed care growth has had similar effects in other areas of the country.
See generally Michael Staten et al., Market Share/Market Power Revisited: A New Test for an
Old Theory, 7 J. HEALTH ECON. 73 (1988) (looking at the effect of managed care payers in
Indiana). But see Bazzoli et al., supra note 103, at 144 (discussing studies concluding that
patient-driven competition still exists in many health care markets without a high level of
managed care penetration and even with the growth of managed care, hospitals continue to
compete based on quality); Entin et al., supra note 5, at 128-30 (arguing that managed care
penetration will not necessarily result in competition based on price).
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are able to obtain lower prices and thus allow consumers to pay lower
prices for health care. 115
Price-based competition benefits consumers. Although such
competition does not necessarily generate the lowest costs,16 it
produces the best quality product at the lowest price."17 Because
third-party payers create incentives for the hospital industry to
compete on price and these payers can only operate when alternative
providers exist,"8 a competitive market should be maintained."m Even
if a particular market has not yet shifted to price competition,
mergers may inhibit entry of managed care organizations and
therefore deprive consumers of future price reductions.1
20
In the hospital industry, price-based competition has benefited
consumers by lowering prices and increasing efficiency.'
2'
Competitive markets protect consumer choice while optimizing qual-
ity and price. 2 2 Therefore, preserving competition in the health care
industry is as important as in other industries.
IV. CASE LAW TREATMENT OF MERGING
HOSPITALS' NONPROFIT STATUS
Prior to Butterworth, numerous courts discussed the
importance of nonprofit status in antitrust analysis. Although
nonprofit status itself does not immunize an entity from antitrust
scrutiny, a few courts have considered nonprofit status relevant in
115. See Zwanziger & Melnick, supra note 108, at 131-32.
116. See Meyer & Rule, supra note 7, at 181.
117. See id.
118. See Zwanziger & Melnick, supra note 108, at 132; see also Sunshine, supra note 60, at
C16; Post-Trial Brief of Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission in Support of Motion for
Preliminary Injunction Public Version (Confidential Material Deleted) at 86-87, FTC v.
Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (No. 1:96-CV-49) [hereinafter
FTC Post-Trial Brief]; Proof Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant Federal Trade Commission at 9-10,
FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (No. 96-2440)
[hereinafter FTC Proof Brief] (stating that without the market power created by the merger, the
hospitals would not be able to reduce the discounts offered to managed care organizations
because the purchasers could always choose the other hospital).
119. See James F. Blumstein, The Application of Antitrust Doctrine to the Healthcare
Industry: The Interweaving of Empirical and Normative Issues, 31 IND. L. REV. 91, 107 (1998);
see also Meyer & Rule, supra note 7, at 177 (stating that "[clompetition belongs in the health-
care field").
120. See Dranove et al., supra note 109, at 202 (stating that mergers may discourage
managed care penetration and therefore may prevent price reductions for the consumer).
121. See Meyer & Rule, supra note 7, at 177-78 (noting that competition adapts to the field




evaluating the likelihood of a merger causing competitive harm.
These courts have questioned whether nonprofit hospitals will
exercise market power since they are not motivated by monetary
goals. Even these courts, however, have not relied solely on this fac-
tor for holding that a merger will not have anti-competitive effects.
Other courts have refused to consider nonprofit status in the
analysis of a merger's likely effects on competition. These courts have
determined that nonprofit entities have the same incentives to act
anti-competitively as for-profits.
Not surprisingly, courts have responded differently to issues
such as: whether the membership of a nonprofit hospital's board of
directors ensures that the merged hospital will not exploit market
power; whether the merging hospitals' previous public service
suggests that the merged hospital will not act anti-competitively in
the future; and whether the hospital's nonprofit status ensures that
any efficiencies from the proposed merger will be passed on to the
consumers.
A. Composition of the Board of Directors
According to the district courts in United States v. Carilion
Health System rm and FTC v. Freeman Hospital, 124the membership of
a nonprofit's board of directors may indicate that a nonprofit merger
is less likely to raise antitrust concern than an equivalent for-profit
merger. These courts found that the composition of the nonprofit
hospitals' board of directors weighed in favor of finding the merger
reasonable. 125 Each stated that a board's membership is a factor when
determining whether to enjoin a merger, yet these courts ultimately
concluded that the merger was not anti-competitive on other
grounds. 12 6 According to the Freeman and Carilion courts, a board
123. United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840 (W.D. Va. 1989), aft'd, 892
F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989).
124. FTC v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 1213 (W.D. Mo. 1995), affd, 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir.
1995).
125. See Carilion, 707 F. Supp. at 849 (stating that the community board consisting of nu-
merous local business leaders has an incentive to keep prices low). See also Freeman, 911 F.
Supp. at 1222-23. The Seventh Circuit rejected the analysis of the Carilion court. See United
States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1286 (7th Cir. 1990). Post-Butterworth, the
court in Long Island Jewish Medical Center noted that the hospital trustees are volunteers, who
are community and business leaders. See United States v. Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F.
Supp. 121, 126 (E.D.N.Y. 1997). In addition, the hospitals offer a large amount of free care.
These factors suggest that "community service not profit maximization, is the hospitals' mis-
sion." Id. at 145-46.
126. In Freeman, the court held that the government had not established the geographic
market. See Freeman, 911 F. Supp. at 1226-27. Likewise, in Carilion, the court found that the
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consisting of community leaders prevents anti-competitive behavior
and ensures that a merger's benefits are passed on to consumers.
127
These courts reasoned that even if an entity has market power,
business and community leaders do not have an incentive to raise
prices above a competitive level.' Indeed, the Freeman court
accepted the theory that nonprofit hospitals act like a consumer coop-
erative when the board of directors has a stake as consumers in the
hospital's operations. 2 9 Therefore, in both Freeman and Carilion the
notion that nonprofits operate differently than for-profits because of
their unique concern for the community and its needs underlies the
courts' confidence in the community boards.1
30
Numerous courts have questioned the assumption that non-
profit hospitals lack economic incentives to act anti-competitively and
actual geographic market was much broader than the definition offered by DOJ. See Carilion,
707 F. Supp. at 847-48. Therefore, the government did not establish that the hospitals would
have market power in the geographic market. See id. The court in Carilion only briefly dis-
cussed the significance of nonprofit status, stating only that nonprofit status "militates in favor
of finding their combination reasonable." Id. at 849. Similarly, while the post-Butterworth deci-
sion of the Long Island Jewish Medical Center court agreed that board composition suggests
that profit maximization may not be the hospital's primary motivator, it still made clear that
not-for-profit status should receive "only limited and non-determinative effect." Long Island
Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. at 146. Instead, the decision relied on analysis of the merger's
competitive impact. See id. at 149; see also Blumstein, supra note 119, at 117. Unlike
Butterworth, the Long Island Jewish Medical Center court determined that the merger would
not result in the hospital having an undue share of the market as at least one existing hospital
could constrain the merged hospital's ability to raise prices above a competitive level. See Long
Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 983 F. Supp. at 145.
127. See Carilion, 707 F. Supp at 846; see also Freeman, 911 F. Supp. at 1222-23.
128. See Carilion, 707 F. Supp. at 849; see also Freeman, 911 F. Supp. at 1222-23
(emphasizing that business and community leaders served on the board of directors).
129. The court in Freeman determined that community boards operate like a consumer
cooperative and cited both Lynk and Hansmann. Freeman, 911 F. Supp. at 1222-23; see Lynk,
Nonprofit Hospital Mergers, supra note 5, at 458 (stating that a board of directors that
effectively represents the community likely operates more like a cooperative); see also Lynk,
Property Rights, supra note 5, at 377 (noting that in cases involving nonprofit hospitals gov-
erned by a board of directors the "property rights" of the hospital "turn it essentially into a con-
sumer cooperative"); Hansmann, supra note 20, at 889 (discussing that when owners of an or-
ganization have a stake in it as consumers, it is unlikely that prices will be raised above a nor-
mal competitive level). Outside of the hospital industry, the district court in Fuchs v. Rural
Electric Convenience Cooperative, Inc. accepted this argument. See Fuchs v. Rural Elec.
Convenience Cooperative, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 1111, 1114 (C.D. I. 1987).
130. See Freeman, 911 F. Supp. at 1222-23; see also FTC v. Freeman Hospital, 69 F.3d 260,
263 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting the district court judge during a temporary restraining order hear-
ing: "It looks to me like Washington, D.C. once again thinks they know better what's going on
in southwest Missouri. I think they ought to stay in D.C."). There is a perception that the
governance of a hospital is a local issue and the federal antitrust laws should not apply. See
Entin et al., supra note 5, at 127-28. But see William J. Baer, Director of Bureau of
Competition, Antitrust and Health Care: New Approaches and Challenges, Address Before the
American Bar Association (Oct. 24, 1996), available in 1996 WL 613763 (F.T.C.) at *8-10
[hereinafter Baer Speech].
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have rejected reliance on a board's ability to prevent anti-competitive
behavior. In HCA, the court emphasized that nonprofit hospitals pos-
sess incentives to collude, noting fear of competition from for-profits
and cost-containment policies of third-party payers. 131 Similarly, in
FTC v. University Health, Inc., the court was unconvinced that non-
profit status indicated that the merger would not have anti-competi-
tive effects. 13 2  The court in United States v. Rockford Memorial
Corp.'s' rejected the defendant's argument that a decisionmaker only
acts anti-competitively when motivated by personal gain.'3 ' Instead,
the court reasoned that other motivations, such as a higher salary, a
better office or title, or new equipment may spur anti-competitive
behavior. 35  In Rockford, the district court was skeptical that a
community-oriented board could prevent the hospital from engaging
in anti-competitive conduct.3 6  The district court in United States v.
Mercy Health Services'37 emphasized that "there is nothing inherent
in the structure of the corporate board or the nonprofit status of the
hospitals which would operate to stop any anti-competitive behav-
ior."18 Even if the current board intends to act in the public interest,
this provides no assurance that its membership will not change and
raise prices to an anti-competitive level.3
9
131. See Hospital Corp. of America v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1390 (7th Cir. 1986); see also
Magleby, supra note 2, at 168-69 (discussing that courts such as HCA and Rockford did not ac-
cept the argument that nonprofit hospital mergers are anti-competitive).
132. FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991).
133. United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D. IM. 1989) afrd, 898
F.2d 1278 (11th Cir. 1990).
134. See Rockford, 717 F. Supp. at 1284.
135. See id. at 1284. On appeal, the circuit court stated that nonprofit hospitals were just
as likely to act anti-competitively as for-profit hospitals. See United States v. Rockford
Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 1990).
136. See Rockford, 717 F. Supp. at 286-87 (stating that the board's composition and non-
profit status had not prevented anti-competitive behavior).
137. United States v. Mercy Health Servs., 902 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
138. Id. at 989. Notably, the court in Mercy Health concluded that the merger was not
anti-competitive, however, it did not accept nonprofit status as a consideration. See id.
139. See id. (emphasizing that although the court believed the current board members did
not intend to raise prices, if the board was replaced there remains potential for anti-competitive
behavior unchecked by the structure of a nonprofit). In the most recent challenge to a merger of
nonprofit hospitals, the court in Long Island Jewish Medical Center stated that it gave limited
effect to the structure of the board for purposes of antitrust analysis and quoted Mercy Health




B. Past Behavior of Merging Hospitals
In addition to the board's composition, the past behavior of the
merging hospitals has also factored into the analysis of some of the
courts that have considered nonprofit status. Specifically, these
courts have looked at whether the merging parties have previously
acted anti-competitively or whether the entities have acted in the
community's best interests. 140 In Freeman, the court looked at the
hospitals' past behavior and found collusion was unlikely to result
from the merger.'4 ' In University Health, however, the court found
the merger would have anti-competitive effects despite evidence of
past public service. 42 The court explained that a well-intentioned
board of directors, which had previously acted for the community's
benefit, could always change its behavior. 43
C. Consideration of Efficiencies
Prior to Butterworth, the two district courts that had consid-
ered nonprofit status relevant stressed that the claimed efficiencies
produced by a merger would benefit consumers.'" The district court
in Carilion accepted the defendant's argument that the efficiencies
would be realized by the merger and passed on to consumers. 45 The
court believed that the nonprofit hospital's board of directors would
ensure that consumers benefited from these savings. 46
In contrast, the district court in Rockford 47 and the circuit
court in University Health'48 were unconvinced that the respective
mergers would produce efficiencies that would benefit the consumer.
These courts made clear that efficiencies must be adequately proven
and specific.'" Significantly, these courts required a high level of
140. See United States v. Carilion Health Sys., 707 F. Supp. 840, 842 (W.D. Va. 1989) affd,
892 F.2d 1042 (4th Cir. 1989); see also United States v. Freeman Hosp., 911 F. Supp. 213, 1224
(W.D. Mo. 1995) affd, 69 F.3d 260 (8th Cir. 1995).
141. See Freeman, 911 F. Supp. at 1224.
142. See FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1224 (11th Cir. 1991).
143 See id. at 1225-26.
144. See e.g., Freeman, 911 F. Supp. at 1224; Carilion 707 F. Supp. at 846.
145. See Carilion, 707 F. Supp. at 845-46.
146. See id. at 846.
147. See United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1251, 1291-92 (N.D. Ill.
1989) affd, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990).
148. See University Health, 938 F.2d at 1223 (stating that a defendant must show the effi-
ciencies will benefit consumers).
149. See id. at 1223; Rockford, 717 F. Supp. at 1291.
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evidence to find that efficiencies outweigh anti-competitive effects. 150
The savings achieved must outweigh the risks of a highly concen-
trated market.151 Ultimately, these opinions emphasize that the effect
of the efficiencies on competition is a significant consideration in anti-
trust analysis.152
V. ANALYSIS OF BUTTERWORTHAND THE ISSUES IT RAISES
A. District Court Decision
The district court in Butterworth refused to enjoin the merger
between Blodgett and Butterworth, although it acknowledged that the
merger would create high market concentration and bestow an undue
market share on the merged entity.153  The court emphasized that
nonprofit status should be taken into consideration in evaluating the
anti-competitive effects of the merger.,M
The district court relied on a number of factors relating to
nonprofit status in determining that the merger was unlikely to have
anti-competitive effects. Although a few courts have given some
weight to board composition and efficiencies, these courts paid much
less attention to these factors than the Butterworth court.
150. See University Health, 938 F.2d at 1222-23; see also Rockford, 717 F. Supp. at 1291
(requiring clear and convincing evidence).
151. See Rockford, 717 F. Supp. at 1291.
152. See University Health, 938 F.2d at 1222; see also id. at 1224; Baer Speech, supra note
130, at *10.
153. See FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1293-94 (W.D. Mich. 1996)
affd, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). In Butterworth, the HHi calculations made by
the FTC's expert established that the relevant markets would be highly concentrated after the
merger. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1294. The merged entity would have 47 to 65 percent
share of the market for general acute care inpatient hospital services. See id. As a result, the
post-merger HHI in this market would be 2767 to 4521, an increase of 1064 to 1889 points. See
id. Further, the merged facility would control between 65 to 70 percent of the primary care
inpatient hospital services market, resulting in a Hi of between 4506 and 5079, an increase of
1675 to 2001 points. See id The court also accepted the governmentfs product and geographic
market definitions and its entry analysis-that high barriers to entry existed. See id. at 1294,
1297-98. It is also notable that more evidence of competitive restraint existed in this case than
in others that enjoined the proposed merger. See University Health, 938 F.2d at 1218-19; see
also United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1283-84 (7th Cir. 1990).
154. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1302; see also William McD. Miller, M, Is There a




First, according to the district court, the defense expert's find-
ings demonstrated that nonprofits act differently than for-profits. 155
In the court's view, this evidence suggested that the market share and
concentration statistics did not accurately predict the merger's com-
petitive effects.156 The court accepted the defendant's argument that
the traditional correlation between high prices and high concentration
did not apply to nonprofits. 57 At least one expert, however, has
suggested that the Butterworth decision was based more on the
benevolent nature of the nonprofit board than a reasoned economic
analysis.158
Second, the district court accepted the composition of the
merging hospitals' boards as assurance that the merger would benefit
the community.159 Here, the court cited testimony of the chairmen of
the Butterworth and Blodgett boards to demonstrate the boards' good
intentions. 60 The court believed that the boards' structures, coupled
with evidence that the price-concentration correlation did not apply to
nonprofit hospitals, demonstrated that nonprofit hospitals do not
share the incentive to maximize profits. 16'
According to the FTC, the merged hospital was just as likely to
exercise its market power as a for-profit one. Both of the hospitals
had previously attempted to reduce competition, 62 and one of the
155. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1295 (stating that Dr. Lynk first studied the
California hospital industry and then used the same methods to look at the industry in
Michigan). The court in Butterworth stated that Dr. Lynk's findings were "undisputed," citing
to Dr. Lynk's law review article. Id. at 1297.
156. See id. at 1295-96. The defendants claimed to offer the type of empirical evidence dis-
cussed in Rockford. See id. at 1295. In that case, Judge Posner noted that evidence of price-
concentration correlation for the hospital industry would be helpful in evaluating competitive
effects. See United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1286 (7th Cir. 1990).
157. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1295-96. But evidence indicates that the hospitals
competed in the same manner as for-profits prior to the merger. See FTC Proof Brief, supra
note 118, at 28-31 (discussing evidence that the two hospitals competed with each other on price
which suggests that the traditional correlation applies and competition results in lower prices
for managed care organizations and more efficient operations).
158. See Blumstein, supra note 119, at 110-11.
159. Other courts have explicitly rejected this argument. See supra notes 136-39 and
accompanying text.
160. The Chairmen of the Blodgett and Butterworth boards testified that the two had de-
cided to merge because of "a common desire to lower health care costs and improve the quality
of care." Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1297. The court mentioned the board chairmen by name.
See id. One commentator has suggested the district court in Butterworth pointed out these
individuals in an effort to hold them accountable for the future decisions of the merged hospital.
See Miller, supra note 154, at 7-8.
161. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1296-97.
162. See FTC Post-Trial Brief, supra note 118, at 71-72 The FTC stated the hospital had
refused to give discounts to managed care organizations in services in which either institution
had a monopoly. See id. at 71. According to the FTC, the two parties intended to merge so the
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hospitals had achieved double digit profit margins.163 Absent the
merger, Blodgett planned to spend $200 million on a replacement fa-
cility although this amount was considered excessive. 164 The hospi-
tals' actions suggested that the boards of directors, however well-in-
tentioned, had little influence over hospital administrators and op-
erations. Alternatively, the hospital boards may have aligned them-
selves with the institution, potentially preventing them from acting in
the community's best interests. 165
Third, the district court credited the Community Commitment
as additional evidence of the merging hospitals' good intentions and
that the merged hospital would not act anti-competitively in the fu-
ture.166 According to the district court, the Commitment "corroborates
other evidence that nonprofit hospitals may be treated differently un-
der the antitrust laws," and further suggests that the FTC's prima
facie case inaccurately predicts the future conduct of the merged en-
tity. 167 This decision appears to be the first time a federal court has
accepted this type of price promise. 68
In Butterworth, the Community Commitment had five parts in
which the merged entity promised: (1) to freeze hospital charges for
three years; (2) to freeze prices to managed care organizations; (3) to
merged facility could exercise market power over managed care organizations. See FTC Proof
Brief, supra note 118, at 29; FTC Post-Trial Brief, supra note 118, at 73.
163. See FTC Post-Trial Brief, supra note 118, at 72. The FTC also noted that the above-
average profits achieved by both hospitals suggests that the boards of directors was not acting
in the consumers' interests. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1297. A local paper reported that
Butterworth's profit margins had reached the double digits, suggesting that the hospital was
more focused on the success of the institution than community interests. See Another Look at
Hospital Plan: FTC Should Appeal Judge's OK of Butterworth-Blodgett Merger, THE GRAND
RAPIDS PRESs, Oct. 3, 1996, at A16 [hereinafter Another Look at Hospital Plan]. The court in
Butterworth, however, found these profits acceptable. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1297.
In addition, prior to the merger, Blodgett raised its prices. See Mary Chris Jaklevic, Price Hikes
to HMOs Preceded Merger of Michigan Hospitals, MOD. HEALTHCARE, Nov. 10, 1997, at 2. Thus,
the merged facility could then freeze prices to the HMOs at a higher price. See id.
164. See FTC Post-Trial Brief, supra note 118, at 95-96. A commission of community lead-
ers had determined that Blodgett did not need to spend this amount to remain competitive. See
id. at 96. Further, Blodgett intended to construct a replacement facility if the merger failed.
See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1301; see also Another Look at Hospital Plan, supra note 163,
at A16 (noting that the two hospitals had previously been more concerned with competing with
one another than acting in the community's interest).
165. See infra Part VI.B.1. The Butterworth court also noted the significant role of
fiduciary duty to the hospital by stating that because of their duty to the hospital, absent the
merger the Blodgett Board of Directors would continue with plans for a new facility. See
Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1301.
166. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1298.
167. Id.
168. See Miller, supra note 154, at 8; see also Sunshine, supra note 60, at C16. For
criticism of the use of this type of agreement, see infra Part V.C.
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limit profit margins; (4) to serve the medically needy; and, (5) to gov-
ern the merged entity in the best interests of the community.169
The FTC challenged the Community Commitment on numer-
ous grounds. 70 The FTC argued that the prices resulting from a
freeze on charges would likely be higher than those in a competitive
market.'71 It also expressed concern about the hospital equalizing
rates to managed care because this practice limited these purchasers'
ability to compete among themselves to obtain lower prices from the
hospitals.7 2 The FTC further argued that the profit margin commit-
ment would permit the merged hospital to earn above what it would
in a competitive market in which operating margins are expected to
decline because of managed care and other third-party payers. 73
Moreover, it noted that an entity can get around the price limitations
by reducing the quality of care provided. 7 4 Finally, the FTC noted
that even though the parties agreed to make the Commitment legally
binding,' 75 it is unclear how this agreement will be enforced. 7 6
169. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1298. The FTC only challenged the first three fac-
tors. See id.
170. See id. While the federal antitrust enforcement agencies have not accepted price
promises, some state attorneys general have permitted mergers that have offered price com-
mitments. See David Burda & Mary Chris Jaklevic, Promises, Promises: Hospitals Are Using
Price-Control Pledges to Win Antitrust Clearance from States, But the Feds Are Wary. MOD.
HEALTHCARE, Feb. 19, 1996, at 26, 27-32.
171. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1298 (noting the FTC challenged the "charge com-
mitment" as illusory because hospital price increases have been decelerating and prices might
decrease); see also Baer Speech, supra note 130, at *9-*10.
172. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1298 (stating the FTC claims this part of the
Commitment is "deliberately anticompetitive"). If the merged hospital equalized prices for the
managed care organizations this would raise the prices charged to some organizations and as a
result, eliminate discounts. See FTC Post-Trial Brief, supra note 118, at 62. The district court
in Butterworth believed that discounts to managed care organizations did not benefit consumers
as a whole and were "hardly the sort of benefit the antitrust laws are designed to protect."
Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1299.
173. See FTC Post-Trial Brief, supra note 118, at 74-75.
174. See Baer Speech, supra note 130, at *10. Nothing in the Commitment requires a cer-
tain level of quality. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1298.
175. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1298 (stating that the defendants were willing to en-
ter into a consent decree making the Community Commitment legally binding).
176. See id. (stating that the FTC challenges the plan in part because it is unenforceable).
The FTC did not agree to the consent decree, leaving the district court judge to enforce it. The
FTC does not have resources to regulate this type of written assurance. See Burda & Jaklevic,
supra note 170, at 28. The district judge, however, did not agree to have jurisdiction over
enforcement of the Community Commitment. See Deanna Bellandi, Being Not-For-Profit Helps:
In Antitrust Cases, Judges Have Been Giving Hospitals Credit for Tax-Exempt Status, MOD.
HEALTHCARE, Nov. 10, 1997, at 17.
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Finally, the district court was convinced that the merger would
result in substantial efficiencies. 177 This decision appears to be based,
in part, on the court's belief that competition in the hospital industry
does not result in lower costs.Y78 According to the hospitals' expert,
the efficiencies achieved by a merger between two nonprofit hospitals
may, in part, explain the absence of price-concentration correlation in
nonprofits. 17 Because of the parties' nonprofit status and Community
Commitment, the district court concluded that these savings would be
passed on to consumers. s0
B. Critique of District Court Decision
The district court in Butterworth accepted the defendant's ar-
gument that nonprofit hospitals operate differently than for-profits,
and found that the merger would not have anti-competitive effects. In
so doing, Butterworth departed from traditional antitrust analysis
and prior case law. Contrary to antitrust doctrine, the court allowed
governance by the board of directors and the Community
Commitment to replace competition. Consideration of the hospital's
nonprofit status does not fit into the antitrust framework because it
does not justify lessened concern about the merger's anti-competitive
effects. Furthermore, the previous cases that considered nonprofit
status a relevant factor in their evaluation of the proposed merger
ultimately allowed the merger to proceed based on other grounds. In
contrast, the Butterworth court relied on the merging hospitals'
nonprofit structure to ensure that the merged entity would not act
anti-competitively in the future.
1. Departure from Traditional Antitrust Policy
Butterworth departs from prevailing antitrust doctrine by find-
ing that a merger among nonprofit hospitals requires different treat-
ment than one among for-profits. The Clayton Act is intended to pre-
vent mergers whose effect "may be substantially to lessen competi-
177. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1300-01. The court, however, did not adequately
evaluate the claimed efficiencies especially in light of the fact that it considered efficiencies as
part of the defendant's rebuttal evidence. See Greaney, supra note 16, at 219.
178. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1301 (stating that absent the merger, the "medical
arms race" will continue).
179. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1295 (quoting Lynk, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers,
supra note 5, at 458).
180. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1301.
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tion,"181 because undue increases in market power will allow an entity
to raise prices above a competitive level and thus injure consumers. 182
Since Congress has determined that reduced competition hurts con-
sumers, a court should only determine whether competition is less-
ened.183 Once a court determines that the merger will cause com-
petitive harm, specific characteristics of an industry,184 motives, 85 or
organizational structure'88 become irrelevant. A court may not re-
place competition with another method of allocating goods and serv-
ices. 8 7
The district court declined to enjoin the merger, even though it
recognized that the merged hospital would have substantial market
power, unchallenged by the remaining hospitals or potential en-
trants.8 8 The court made its own determination about how the
merger would affect the community and relied on the alleged good
motives of the merging hospitals to find that the merger would not
have anti-competitive effects. In its view, the governing body of the
merged hospital would act in the best interests of the community.
Even if the board of the merged entity was well-intentioned, the
court's decision was contrary to antitrust doctrine because it allowed
the board to make decisions about allocation, rather than allowing
market forces to operate.189
a. Consideration of Motive
In both Philadelphia National Bank and NCAA, the Supreme
Court held that good motives cannot validate a practice which violates
the antitrust laws.'9 These decisions establish that when market
power is abused, good intentions are irrelevant to antitrust analy-
181. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
182. See Hospital Corp. of America v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1386 (7th Cir. 1986); see also
NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984).
183. See National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978).
184. See id. at 689.
185. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101 n.23 (stating that "good motives will not validate an oth-
erwise anticompetitive practice.").
186. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
187. A court may not determine if another method is better than competition. See United
States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371 (1963).
188. See FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1294 (W.D. Mich. 1996)
affd, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). The court acknowledged that the two remaining
hospitals would not challenge the merged hospital's market power. See id.
189. See Sunshine, supra note 60, at C16.
190. See Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. at 371; see also NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100 n.23.
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sis.191 Thus, if a merger is potentially anti-competitive, a court cannot
rely on the claimed good intentions of a board of directors to rebut the
presumption of illegality. Appellate courts have also rejected the
argument that good motives can validate a merger that otherwise vio-
lates the antitrust laws. 192 Abuse of market power, even if motivated
by good intentions, still causes consumer injury and violates the
antitrust laws. 1
93
b. The District Court Allowed Community Governance
to Replace Competition
Moreover, through the federal antitrust statutes, Congress has
mandated that competition is the best guarantor of consumer wel-
fare. 9 4 The Supreme Court has stated that a court may not substitute
another method of allocating goods and services for competition. 95 In
Professional Engineers, the Court made clear that defendants may not
question the benefits of competition. The Court held that if unique
characteristics of an industry suggest competition is inapplicable, only
Congress can exempt the industry from antitrust scrutiny. 196 In
Butterworth, however, the court did not rely on competitive forces,
finding instead that a board of directors consisting of community
leaders and the Community Commitment sufficiently protected
consumers. 197 The court allowed these factors to replace competition.
191. Although motive is irrelevant for anti-competitive conduct, the actors' subjective
intent can help a court evaluate the anti-competitive potential of the conduct. See 1A AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 1 261c, at 265-66.
192. See FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1213 (11th Cir. 1991) (rejecting the
argument that a merged hospital will not act anti-competitively because of its nonprofit struc-
ture); see also United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 1990).
193. See IA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 1 261c, at 267. Nonprofits must still
make decisions about the allocation of profits, and if a nonprofit entity is using market power to
charge anti-competitive prices this violates the antitrust laws. See id. Further, even if a board
has good intentions, the consumer coop analogy will not work if the hospital is part of a chain or
if the board only represents a limited segment of the community. See Lynk, Property Rights,
supra note 5, at 377.
194. See National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,695 (1978).
195. In Professional Engineers, the Court rejected the association's argument that competi-
tion in its industry was detrimental to consumer welfare. See id. at 689-90; see also FTC v.
Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411,423-24 (1990).
196. See Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 689-90 (stating that a court cannot determine if
competition is good or bad for a particular industry because this choice must be addressed by
the legislature). Congress has determined that certain industries, such as agricultural coopera-
tives and insurance, are exempt from all Sherman Act requirements. See id. at 690 n.14.
197. See FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1302 (W.D. Mich. 1996)
affd, 121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (stating that "the interests of consumers
are... likely to be advanced rather than hurt" by the merger). Compare the type of regulation
the court allows here to the strict requirements for regulation by the state as discussed supra
notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
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In short, instead of accepting the value of competitive markets as
required by Supreme Court precedent, the court made its own
determination about what method best protects consumer welfare in
the nonprofit hospital industry.
2. Contrary to Prior Case Law
The Butterworth district court claimed to follow previous case
law by stating that it did not rely on nonprofit status itself. It also
argued that earlier cases suggested that status, along with other evi-
dence demonstrating that the merger will not have anti-competitive
effects, can be relevant when determining whether to enjoin a
merger.
98
Although the court stated nonprofit status was not a
"dispositive consideration,"19 all of the evidence relied upon by the
district court suggests the hospitals' status was indeed dispositive.
Arguably, this case is inconsistent with prior case law, which holds
that a court cannot consider nonprofit status alone to rebut the pre-
sumption of illegality.
2°°
Even if the court treated nonprofit status as a "material" fac-
tor,201 the Butterworth case marks a significant shift from prior case
law.202 In the hospital context, the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits203
and one district court 2 4 have held that nonprofit mergers in
concentrated markets raise the same antitrust concerns as equivalent
for-profit mergers. In contrast, the district court in Butterworth
presumed that a nonprofit merger was less likely than a for-profit one
to have anti-competitive effects. The court made this determination
absent evidence that justified lessened concern and instead relied on
the claimed good intentions of the merging hospitals to prevent anti-
competitive behavior. Although two other district courts had consid-
ered nonprofit status relevant, these courts ultimately permitted the
198. See id. at 1297.
199. See id.
200. See Hospital Corp. of America v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1390 (7th Cir. 1986); see also
FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1224 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rockford
Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1285 (7th Cir. 1990).
201. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp at 1297.
202. See Greaney, supra note 16, at 211-12 (stating that Butterworth is in "stark contrast"
to the holding of Freeman which is consistent with prior case law).
203. See, e.g., University Health, 938 F.2d at 1224; Rockford, 898 F.2d at 1285; Hospital
Corp. of America, 807 F.2d at 1390-91.
204. See United States v. Mercy Health Services, 902 F. Supp. 968, 989 (N.D. Iowa 1995)
vacated by 107 F.3d 632, 634 (8th Cir. 1997).
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mergers for other reasons and placed much less significance on non-
profit status.
20 5
3. General Dynamics Merger Inquiry
Market share and concentration data may not always indicate
market power will result from the merger. At first glance, the district
court's reliance on nonprofit status is consistent with the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. General Dynamics. There the
Court held that a court can consider evidence that indicates the pro-
posed merger is unlikely to have anti-competitive effects despite sta-
tistical evidence to the'contrary.20 6 In General Dynamics, one of the
merging firms had experienced severe reductions in its coal reserves
and was unable to compete in the future.207 The one party's reduction
in resources and its limited ability to compete prospectively prevented
the market share data from adequately predicting the defendant's fu-
ture competitive strength.2
8
In contrast, in Butterworth, evidence indicated that the defen-
dants had competed in the past.20 9 The parties simply claimed that
the merged facility would not take advantage of its market power be-
cause of its nonprofit status,2 10 an argument that differs from the one
accepted by the Court in General Dynamics.2 1 First, in Butterworth,
the court recognized that the merger would lessen competition in the
marketplace. 2 2 Unlike General Dynamics, the merged hospital would
maintain competitive strength. Second, because Butterworth and
Blodgett competed like for-profits in the market prior to the merger,
they could not argue that the merged entity would cease to act like a
for-profit and exploit its market power. Therefore, the market share
205. Note that post-Butterworth, the Long Island Jewish Medical Center court considered
nonprofit status a factor in its overall analysis but ultimately determined that the government
had not proved that the merger would have anti-competitive effects, finding, unlike
Butterworth, that the merged entity would not have an undue market share in the relevant
markets and remaining hospitals could constrain prices. See supra note 139 and accompanying
text.
206. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486,497-98 (1974).
207. See id. at 493.
208. See id. at 501. Because current merger analysis looks at how much the merger will re-
duce competition, the consideration of this type of evidence is consistent with the Merger
Guidelines. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 49, § 0.2, 2.2.
209. See FTC Post-Trial Brief, supra note 118, at 94; see also Another Look at the Hospital
Plan, supra note 163, at A6.
210. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1294-97.
211. But see Greaney, supra note 16, at 215-16 (arguing that the Butterworth decision ad-
hered to the General Dynamics framework).
212. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1294.
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statistics painted an accurate picture of the merged entity's market
power and raised antitrust concerns. Third, while the Court in
General Dynamics relied on objective economic data to adjust the
economic model's predictions of how much a profit-maximizing firm
can influence the market, the Butterworth court predicted behavior
based on subjective intent that led the court to reject the basic postu-
late of the economic model underlying antitrust law: that firms op-
erate to maximize profits. The court made a determination about
what the entity would do with market power rather than focusing on
what the entity was capable of doing with this power.
In sum, the General Dynamics Court held that the government
did not prove its prima facie case that the merger would produce anti-
competitive effects. Because the proposed merger would not lessen
future competition, no antitrust concern resulted.213 Although the
FTC proved its prima facie case in Butterworth, the court concluded
nonprofit status would prevent anti-competitive results and
consumers would not be harmed.
214
C. Competition Guarantees Consumer Welfare
The Butterworth decision raises some interesting issues re-
garding merger analysis. The court held that "even though competi-
tion may be lessened, the interests of consumers are... likely to be
advanced rather than hurt."215 Congress, however, intended to protect
consumers by maintaining competition 216 and the Supreme Court has
stated that Congress has mandated competition as the guiding prin-
ciple for judicial decision making.217 The antitrust laws protect the
competitive process, as competition produces the optimum outcome
for consumers.218
Community governance is not an adequate replacement for
competition for several reasons. First, competition is a more reliable
safeguard of an efficient market and consumer welfare than commu-
213. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486,503-04 (1974).
214. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1294.
215. See id. at 1301.
216. See National Soc'y of Prof. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978). As rec-
ognized in current case law, Section 7 proscribes mergers that are likely to "hurt consumers, as
by making it easier for the firms in the market to collude.., and thereby force price above or
farther above the competitive level." Hospital Corp. of America v. FTC, 807 F.2d 1381, 1386
(7th Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1282-83 (7th
Cir. 1990) (quoting Hospital Corp. of America, 807 F.2d at 1386).
217. See Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 695.
218. See Meyer & Rule, supra note 7, at 181. See also Blumstein, supra note 119, at 111.
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nity governance. 219 Competition encourages producers to offer the
best quality at the lowest price.220 It is also the most efficient method
of allocating goods and services, and the best indicator of consumer
demand. 221 Antitrust law, moreover, focuses on whether the merged
entity will be able to exercise market power without restraint. The
law seeks to protect the competitive process rather than mandate a
particular outcome.
222
Studies indicate that regulation has not effectively reduced
hospital costs or promoted efficient behavior.22 A number of states
that have regulated hospital prices are eliminating this practice and
replacing regulation with a competitive market.22 In other indus-
tries, courts have also recognized that regulation is not an adequate
substitute for competitive free markets.
22
Second, competition provides incentives for entities to provide
information to consumers, allowing consumers to make choices about
quality and price.2 26 The subjective judgment of a board of directors or
the court removes the consumers' freedom to choose. Furthermore,
because Congress has determined that competition ensures consumer
welfare by providing incentives for optimal quality at the lowest price,
regulation may only replace competition if a federal or state immunity
exists.227
219. See Meyer & Rule, supra note 7, at 171 (stating the competition is the best method for
ensuring consumer welfare); see also Baer Speech, supra note 130, at *9. In addition, nonprofit
hospitals that do not face competition will provide unnecessary resources and equipment to
their staff physicians. See John Simpson & Richard Shin, Do Nonprofit Hospitals Exercise
Market Power? 2-3 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Competition serves an
important role in preventing inefficient expenditures "for which good intentions are rarely a
sufficient substitute." See 1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 261c, at 267.
220. See Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. at 695 (explaining that the Sherman Act indicates a
judgment by the legislature that competition produces lower prices and better goods and serv-
ices).
221. See ELBERT V. BOWDEN, ECONOMICS: THE ScIENcE OF COMMON SENSE 138-39 (1974).
The failure of central planning in the USSR demonstrates the superiority of competitive free
markets. See FTC Proof Brief, supra note 118, at 22; see also, LEONARD SILK & MARK SILK,
MAKING CAPITALISM WORK 12, 15 (1996).
222. See Blumstein, supra note 119, at 111.
223. See Baer Speech, supra note 130, at *9.
224. See id.
225. See FTC v. Alliant Techsystems Inc., 808 F. Supp. 9, 16 (1992) (responding to defen-
dants claim the Department of Defense's cost monitoring and auditing would prevent the exer-
cise of market power). The court stated, "[tihere is persuasive opinion in the record that Army
oversight, while effective, is an imperfect substitute for the action of the competitive market."
Id.
226. See Simpson & Shin, supra note 219, at 24 (finding that nonprofits exercise market
power against privately insured patients).
227. See Meyer & Rule, supra note 7, at 175; see also NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S.
104 n.27 (1984) (suggesting that with the passage of the Sherman Act, Congress intended to pro-
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Analysis of the factors accepted by the Butterworth court dem-
onstrates that enforcement by a community board or a price commit-
ment is an inadequate substitute for a competitive market. First, the
evidence accepted by the Butterworth court does not provide perma-
nent assurance that the entity will not act anti-competitively.22 For
example, even if the board of directors is community-minded, the risk
of change in membership of community board exists. Second, there is
no guarantee that a nonprofit board will act in the best interests of
the community or have adequate control over management to prevent
the merged entity from raising prices above a competitive level.229
The danger is exacerbated by the fact that reduced competition
flowing from the merger would give the board nearly unfettered dis-
cretion to behave anti-competitively. 23° Third, even assuming the
hospital believes it is acting in the consumers' best interests, it is un-
likely to produce the same efficient results of a competitive market.2 1
For instance, prices might fall if the market was left to operate. No
matter how well-intentioned, externally-imposed protections are in-
herently inferior to market outcomes. 232 Market pressures create in-
centives for the entity to benefit consumers through innovation, re-
duction of costs or improved quality.233
The price promises accepted in Butterworth, like community
goverance, are similarly less efficient than the free market in allocat-
ing goods and services. The protection provided by the Community
Commitment is also questionable. As acknowledged by the
Butterworth court, this type of commitment does not "provide failsafe
assurances to the community."m Even if the commitment does pro-
tect consumers, a price assurance is a temporary safeguard.25
mote a policy of competition and free trade which would only be replaced in specific circum-
stances).
228. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101 n.23 (stating that good intentions do not provide adequate
protection for consumers); see also FTC v. University Health, Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1224 (11th
Cir. 1991).
229. See infra Part VI.B.1.
230. See Blackstone & Fuhr, supra note 32, at 474.
231. See IA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 261c, at 267.
232. See Blumstein, supra note 119, at 110-11.
233. See Meyer & Rule, supra note 7, at 171.
234. FTC v. Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1298 (W.D. Mich. 1996) affd,
121 F.3d 708 (6th Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
235. The Community Commitment only limits hospital charges for three years and profit
margins for four years. See id.; see also Burda & Jaklevic, Promises, Promises, supra note 170,
at 30 (explaining that term lengths are a negotiating point in these types of agreements).
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VI. NONPROFIT STATUS Is NOT AN ACCuRATE PREDICTOR OF A
MERGER'S ANTI-COMPETITIVE EFFECTS
Nonprofit status is distinguishable from characteristics that
may challenge the accuracy of the analysis of the merger's competitive
harm. Moreover, concerns exist about the ability or desire of a
nonprofit hospital board to guarantee that the nonprofit entity does
not exploit market power. These issues, along with evidence that
price-concentration applies to nonprofits because nonprofits and for-
profits operate similarly in highly concentrated markets, indicate that
a court should not consider nonprofit status as equivalent to those
factors that may successfully rebut a prima facie case.
A. Application of the Antitrust Framework to Nonprofit Status
As discussed above, courts have considered factors such as
ease of entry, the imminent exit of a firm from the market, and effi-
ciencies as evidence that a proposed merger will not lessen competi-
tion despite market share and concentration statistics that suggest
otherwise. First, if entry into a market is "easy," the anti-competitive
effects that normally flow from high market share and concentration
will not result.2 6 If other competitors can easily enter the market and
challenge the existing entities' ability to reduce output and raise
prices, the existing firms will not be able to exercise market power.27
Unlike ease of entry, nonprofit status does not ensure that the entity
will not abuse market power. Instead, a court which allows nonprofit
status to rebut the presumption of illegality assumes that nonprofits
will refrain from exploiting market power because of good motives
and thus depends on the future benevolence of the merged firm,
rather than market analysis. The amount of power a firm possesses
becomes irrelevant because the court trusts the entity to use it wisely.
In contrast to nonprofit status, ease of entry speaks directly to the
merged entity's ability to exercise market power.
If a firm will fail absent the proposed merger and that firm's
assets will leave the relevant market, the merger will not create or
enhance market power.238 Nonprofit status, however, does not indi-
236. See Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins. Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1336 (7th Cir.
1986). Analysis of entry conditions is a fact-intensive inquiry that looks at whether the merged
entity will be able to exercise market power. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 49, § 3.0-3.4.
The most reliable evidence of ease of entry is past entry in a context similar to the current one.
See 2A AREEDAETAL., supra note 50, 420b, at 58.
237. See Ball Memorial, 784 F.2d at 1335.
238. See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 49, § 5.0.
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cate that the same level of competition will exist post-merger.239
Furthermore, courts have rejected the argument that a nonprofit
hospital's past behavior ensures anti-competitive conduct will not oc-
cur in the fature. 0
Efficiencies that generate increased competition or more effec-
tive competition benefit consumers.2 1 In some cases, efficiencies out-
weigh the risk of increased market concentration.2 2 Unlike the pro-
competitive benefits of efficiencies, which counterbalance the risks of
increased concentration, nonprofit status does not advance competi-
tion and is not an inherently pro-competitive factor.
In sum, current evidence regarding nonprofit status does not
suggest that it is equivalent to those factors which show that the sta-
tistical market share and concentration data presents an inaccurate
picture of a merger's competitive effects.2 3 Reliance on nonprofit
status negates the economic analysis underlying antitrust law. A
court which allows nonprofit status to rebut the presumption of i11e-
239. Arguably, if the nonprofit parties can show that they did not compete like for-profits
prior to the merger and, therefore, that the merger would not lessen competition, the parties
could establish something akin to the failing firm defense. This scenario is, at best, unlikely,
given the studies which suggest nonprofit hospitals behave like for-profits.
240. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
241. See Baer Speech, supra note 130, at *10; see also MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 49,
§ 4 (Revised Apr. 8, 1997).
242. The Merger Guidelines explains that efficiencies must be substantial "to reverse the
merger's potential to harm consumers in the relevant market." See MERGER GUIDELINES, supra
note 49, § 4.0 (Revised, Apr. 8, 1997). The higher the concentration resulting from the merger,
the more substantial efficiencies the defendant must show. See id. Courts weigh the efficien-
cies evidence against the risk of a highly concentrated market. See FTC v. University Health,
Inc., 938 F.2d 1206, 1222-23 (11th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Rockford Memorial Corp.,
717 F. Supp. 1251, 1291 (N.D. IMl. 1989) affd, 898 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1990).
243. The illegitimacy of reliance on nonprofit status in antitrust analysis is evidenced by
the possibilities it creates. First, a conversion of a hospital from nonprofit status to for-profit
status could be challenged despite no increase in concentration. Because conversion of nonprofit
hospitals has become increasingly common, it is not unlikely that a nonprofit will be purchased
by a for-profit hospital. See Krause, supra note 34, at 506. If a court relied on nonprofit status
to prevent anti-competitive behavior, a conversion to for-profit form removes any existing
restraints on the exercise of market power. An integral part of antitrust doctrine, however, is
consideration of the merger's effect on market concentration in order to challenge a merger. Ifa
federal antitrust enforcement agency challenged this type of merger it would conflict with
traditional antitrust doctrine which requires increased concentration and does not consider
ownership status relevant to antitrust analysis.
On the other hand, if ownership was transferred from a nonprofit to a for-profit and the
merger was not challenged, a for-profit would achieve market power. Traditional antitrust
doctrine assumes that a for-profit will abuse this power and thus injure consumers. The
economic analysis underlying antitrust law is based on a profit-maximizing model. See MERGER
GUIDELINES, supra note 49, § 1.0.
Another possibility is that a nonprofit hospital outsources some of its health care services to
a for-profit. Even assuming the nonprofit governance does not possess the economic incentives
to act anti-competitively, whether a nonprofit board would be able to prevent a for-profit from
exercising market power is questionable at best.
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gality assumes that the public can rely on a firm's self-restraint. This
assumption makes market analysis irrelevant; the court does not fo-
cus on the amount of market power possessed because the court
trusts the firm to use it benevolently.
B. Concerns Which Further Demonstrate Nonprofit Status is Unlike
the Factors That Fall Within the Antitrust Framework
1. Board of Directors
Courts that have given any consideration to nonprofit status
have concluded that a nonprofit hospital board ensures that the
merged entity will not exercise market power.2" These courts assume
that a nonprofit board has good motives and will benefit consumers.
This confidence may be misplaced because arguably a board
consisting of community members is not analogous to a consumer co-
operative, thus removing any incentive to refrain from anti-competi-
tive behavior. 5 Even a well-intentioned board may not act competi-
tively or be able to prevent hospital management from acting anti-
competitively.26 First, the board members have a fiduciary duty of
care and loyalty to the nonprofit hospital and will likely align with the
institution.27 These duties to the hospital may prevent the board
from acting in the community's best interests.25 Second, the board
244. This confidence is based, in part, on the theory that a community board does not have
the incentive to act anti-competitively. See Entin et al., supra note 5, at 127-28.
245. See IA AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 261c, at 266 (discussing the divided
loyalty of a member to the public and the entity that appointed him); Bozeman, supra note 45,
at 149. Note that Lynk states that the consumer cooperative analogy does not work if the hos-
pital board is subject to pressure from interests outside of the patient population or if the board
only represents the interests of a limited group of patients. See Lynk, Nonprofit Hospital
Mergers, supra note 5, at 458.
246. The federal antitrust agencies reject consideration of the board's makeup. See Baer
Speech, supra note 130, at *9. Some antitrust scholars maintain that reliance on a nonprofit
hospital's board does not guarantee that the community will not be harmed. See IA AREEDA &
HOVENKAMP, supra note 3, 261c, at 266. The FTC used University Health, Rockford and
Mercy Health Services to reject the defendant's argument in Butterworth. See FTC v.
Butterworth Health Corp., 946 F. Supp. 1285, 1296 (W.D. Mich. 1996) afftd, 121 F.3d 708 (6th
Cir. 1997) (per curiam).
247. See FTC Post-Trial Brief, supra note 118, at 96-98. The FTC also notes that align-
ment with the institution is a result of fiduciary duty. Trustees may also want to promote the
status of the institution because it reflects well on them. Thus they may be less concerned
about controlling health care costs. See id.
248. In Butterworth, the FTC argued that board members may develop institutional loyalty
that could overcome the board's community interests. See Butterworth, 946 F. Supp. at 1297.
For example, low consumer prices may in some cases be contrary to a director's fiduciary duty to
the institution. See Greaney, supra note 16, at 217. The duty to the community may also not
guarantee that the board acts in the public interest. See 1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note
594
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may not act on behalf of consumers if its members have conflicts of in-
terest24 9 or if the board is not representative of the community as a
whole.250 Furthermore, because directors are not responsible for the
day-to-day operations of the hospital, they may have limited informa-
tion about pricing practices and often rubber-stamp the decisions of
management.251 Studies indicate that the board members depend on
management for information and follow their instructions.25 2 Board
members also often do not have technical expertise in the nonprofit's
operations.253 Therefore, the board is also likely to have inadequate
oversight over the management's decisions.2 Thus it seems that
even the most well-intentioned board will not act as efficiently as it
would if subject to competitive forces.25 s
3, 261c, at 266 (questioning reliance on a board to act in public interest); see also Steinberg,
supra note 90, at 291 (stating that the board's fiduciary duty to the community may not prevent
anti-competitive conduct by the board because violations of this duty are rarely enforced).
249. See Joseph Berger, Hospital is Haunted by History of Deals with Board Members, N.Y.
TIMiES, Mar. 14, 1999, at 37.
250. See Another Look at the Hospital Plan, supra note 163 (stating that the community
had no assurance post-merger that community interests would be represented on the board); see
also Lynk, Nonprofit Hospital Mergers, supra note 5, at 440-41, 448; Karla Schuster, Boca Raton
Residents Don't Trust Trustees, SUN-SENTINEL, Sept. 26, 1997, at 1B, available in 1997 WL
11404090.
251. See Deborah A. DeMott, Self-Dealing Transactions in Nonprofit Corporations, 59
BROOK. L. REv. 131, 140 (1993) (stating that nonprofit boards may rely on management for in-
formation); Greaney, supra note 16, at 217 (explaining that outside members of boards of non-
profit corporations rarely involve themselves in everyday business decisions); Ceding Local
Control Is the Price To Be Paid For System Advantages, MOD. HEALTHCARE, June 5, 1995, at 36
(stating that local boards often feel that they are rubber-stamping decisions).
252. See Melissa Middleton, Nonprofit Boards of Directors: Beyond the Governance
Function, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 141, 143, 152 (Walter W. Powell
ed., 1987) (concluding that studies show board members acquire most information from man-
agement and follow instructions of management).
253. See Brody, supra note 24, at 467, 500-01 (stating that nonprofit directors usually lack
technical expertise in the nonprofit hospitals' operations).
254. See Monica Langley, Trauma Center: A Nonprofit Hospital Finds Its Executives Were
Making the Profit, WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 1996, at Al (quoting numerous sources stating that
nonprofit hospital boards lack supervision over hospital management); see also Brody, supra
note 24, at 499 (discussing that nonprofit outside directors often lack the time and expertise to
have control over management); Sally Covington, Who Governs The Non-Profit Sector?, FUND
RAISING MGMT., July 1, 1994, at 33, available in 1994 WL 2810915; Gilbert, supra note 46, at
155 (1994) (noting that the IRS is concerned about a nonprofit board's lack of oversight).
255. See supra notes 228-33 and accompanying text; see also Baer Speech, supra note 130,
at *9.
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2. Evidence Suggesting the Traditional Price-Concentration
Correlation Applies to Nonprofit Hospitals
The district court in Butterworth relied on one empirical study
conducted by the hospital's expert in determining that the traditional
presumption does not apply to nonprofit hospitals. According to nu-
merous economists, however, this expert failed to control significant
variables that would affect his study's conclusion.256 Moreover, many
experts have found that the traditional correlation between high
market concentration and high prices applies to nonprofit hospitals.257
These studies support the argument that antitrust agencies should
challenge nonprofit mergers in concentrated markets because these
mergers are just as likely to raise antitrust concerns as similar for-
profit mergers. 5s
256. Lynk's methods and conclusions have been criticized. See Mary Chris Jaklevic,
Ownership and Pricing: Economists Knock Key Study in Grand Rapids Case MOD.
HEALTHCARE, Oct. 6, 1997, at 2; see, e.g., David Dranove & Richard Ludwick, Competition and
Pricing by Nonprofit Hospitals: A Reassessment of Lynk's Analysis, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 87, 88
(1999) (listing two methodical choices that generate bias)); Keeler et al., supra note 112, at 83;
Simpson & Shin, supra note 219, at 22; FTC Proof Brief, supra note 118, at 32 (arguing that Dr.
Lynk's study does not account for numerous significant factors such as cost which may be lower
in rural areas where the hospital market is more concentrated). In addition, Lynk used list
prices instead of the transaction prices. See FTC Post-Trial Brief, supra note 118, at 72. The
use of list prices may affect a study's conclusion regarding traditional assumptions about high
market concentration. See Dranove et al., supra note 109, at 181, 188. Absent from the study
relied upon by the Butterworth court is a discussion of the quality of care provided. See
Sunshine, supra note 60, at C15-C16. Looking only at price does not take into account the
quality of care given. See Paul A. Pautler & Michael G. Vita, Hospital Market Structure,
Hospital Competition, and Consumer Welfare: What Can the Evidence Tell Us? 10 J. CoNrEMP.
HEALTH L. & POLY 117, 133, 140 (1994). Note that Lynk has responded to these challenges.
See generally William J. Lynk & Lynette R. Neuman, Price and Profit, 18 J. HEALTH ECON. 99
(1999).
257. See Dranove & Ludwick, supra note 256, at 97 (rejecting Lynk's finding that nonprofit
mergers are associated with lower prices); Keeler et al., supra note 112, at 83 (finding that
nonprofit mergers lead to higher prices). Nonprofit hospitals set higher prices when they have
market power. See Simpson & Shin, supra note 219, at 24. The need to cross- subsidize may be
a motive for a nonprofit hospital to use market power. See 1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra
note 3, 261c, at 267. In fact, William Lynk, notes this in his own article. See William J. Lynk,
Antitrust Analysis and Hospital Certificate-of-Need Policy, 32 ANTITRUST BULL. 61, 68-69 (1987)
(explaining why the process of "cross-subsidizations" is economically inefficient).
258. See Dranove & Ludwick, supra note 256, at 19; see also Gruber, supra note 114, at 208
(suggesting that nonprofit hospitals exploit market power to fund indigent care); see also
Simpson & Shin, supra note 219, at 24. Evidence exists that nonprofits exercise market power.




The district court in Butterworth held, and the Sixth Circuit af-
firmed, that a merger between two nonprofit hospitals would not have
anti-competitive effects. Although the FTC's prima facie case demon-
strated that the merger would reduce competition, the district court
presumed that the nonprofit nature of the merged hospital would en-
sure the merger would not harm consumers.
Reliance on the good intentions of a nonprofit board in
evaluating whether a merger will have anti-competitive effects, how-
ever, departs from traditional antitrust analysis and prior case law.
Congress has determined that preserving competition, instead of re-
lying on regulation and monitoring, is the best way to protect con-
sumers. Congress can make a legislative judgment that competition
is not effective in a specific industry, and states can use the state-ac-
tion doctrine to replace competition. The role of the courts in
antitrust cases, however, is to focus on the merger's likely competitive
effects. Nonprofit status is distinguishable from the factors which
demonstrate that market share and concentration statistics
inaccurately predict the merger's effects. These factors fit within
traditional antitrust analysis because they demonstrate that a
proposed merger will not lessen competition. In contrast, nonprofit
status does not indicate that the proposed merger will not have anti-
competitive effects. Thus, reliance on the future benevolence of the
merged entity does not fit into the legal framework of merger
analysis.
A merger among nonprofit hospitals in a concentrated market
raises the same antitrust concerns as a merger among for-profit hos-
pitals in similar circumstances. Studies have found that nonprofit
and for-profit hospitals share critical similarities in their conduct, and
that the price-concentration correlation does apply to nonprofit hospi-
tals. Furthermore, because market power allows an entity to raise
prices and restrict output, confidence in the benevolence of nonprofits
is likely to backfire, leaving communities across the country with a
large profitable hospital that acts contrary to the best interests of
consumers. Because most hospitals in the United States are
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organized as nonprofits, if this decision's treatment of nonprofit
status is followed by future courts, the consumer may be harmed.
Amanda J. Vaughn*
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